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ABSTRACT 
 
 
 
 
Using a contemporary change management model as the analytical framework, this 
dissertation examines how Richard Burdon Haldane, the Liberal Imperialist Secretary of 
State for War (1905-1912), implemented lasting reform of the British Army, when his 
immediate predecessors, Brodrick and Arnold-Forster, had failed.  It considers how 
political expediency, foreign policy and military strategy influenced Haldane and why his 
nation in arms concept did not improve the public’s perception of the regular and auxiliary 
forces.  The dissertation concludes that Haldane understood the intellectual complexities of 
institutional change and that lasting reform required the technical and social dimensions of 
it to be addressed simultaneously and as an organic whole.  His understanding of Hegelian 
philosophy provided him with a means of synthesising numerous ideas into a viable 
solution and his intellectual, social and political skills provided him with the tools to 
implement it.  Coupled with a long tenure in office and the support of first-class military 
advisors, who included Major General Haig and Colonel Ellison, Haldane’s success was 
not, as he claimed, that he entered office without preconceived ideas about army reform, 
but that he did not announce them.  By doing so, he gained the support of the reform-weary 
Generals in the War Office. 
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CHAPTER ONE 
INTRODUCTION 
‘If you organize the British Army, you’ll ruin it’1 
 
In 1919, Field Marshal Sir Douglas Haig addressed a copy of his despatches to ‘the greatest 
Secretary for War England (sic) has ever had!’2  The recipient was the catalyst and driving 
force behind the radical transformation of the British Army from a disjointed, ill-guided 
and poorly equipped force to what the official historian of the First World War called 
‘incomparably the best trained, best organised and best equipped British Army that ever 
went forth to war’.3  When Richard Burdon Haldane, the Secretary of State for War from 
1905 to 1912, assumed his post, the British Army would have struggled to mobilise 
expeditiously for a Continental war; it was undermanned, incorrectly structured and lacked 
direction.  Its second line, which consisted of the Militia, was restricted to home service and 
its third line of Volunteer and Yeomanry units lacked the transport to make it capable of 
action as a mobile force.  Yet nine years later, six regular and fourteen auxiliary divisions 
were efficiently mobilised and, two weeks after war was declared, the British Expeditionary 
Force (BEF) was deployed in France.4  Thereafter, from its initial major engagement at 
Mons to the climactic First Battle of Ypres, the BEF fought to near annihilation but in 
doing so, saved Britain from possible defeat and, perhaps more importantly, bought time 
for the mobilisation of a citizen army.5  Haldane’s role in this was pivotal and this 
                                                          
1 An unnamed distinguished officer in a high position at the War Office quoted in a letter from Lt Gen Sir 
Gerald Ellison to Lady Haig, 11 Sep 1928, Haig Mss, National Library of Scotland (NLS), Acc 3155.40q 
2 H.T. Baker, ‘Lord Haldane’, Army Quarterly, Vol 17 (October 1928), p.13 
3 Brigadier General J.E. Edmonds, Military Operations, France and Belgium, 1914 (Volume I, London: 
HMSO, 1925), pp.10-11 
4 R.C. Ensor, England 1870 – 1914 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1936), p.525 
5 D. Ascoli, The Mons Star: The British Expeditionary Force 1914 (Edinburgh: Birlinn Ltd, 2001), p.X 
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dissertation will argue that his appointment to the War Office in December 1905 ensured 
that the right man was in the right place at the right time. 
 
In the aftermath of the failed Relugas Plot, which was the scheme devised by the Liberal 
Imperialists to place Lord Rosebery as the Prime Minister, Haldane, the Liberal Member 
for East Lothian, was disappointed at not being made Lord Chancellor in Campbell-
Bannerman’s new government.  Reluctantly accepting the post of Secretary of State for 
War, Haldane recalled later in his memoirs that Campbell-Bannerman informed him that 
‘Nobody ... will touch the War Office with a pole’.6  Rising to the challenge, Haldane 
received his Ministerial Seals of Office from King Edward VII at a time of considerable 
international, departmental, political and domestic upheaval.  Balfour’s previous Unionist 
government, an alliance of Conservatives and Liberal Unionists who opposed Irish Home 
Rule, had ended Britain’s ‘Splendid Isolation’ by entering into an alliance with Japan and 
negotiating an entente with France to safeguard colonial interests.  His two immediate 
predecessors, Brodrick and Arnold-Forster, had left the War Office in a state of confusion, 
intrigue and turmoil.  They bequeathed a deficient and fragmented army which had been 
condemned by the Royal Commission charged with examining the Army’s poor 
performance in South Africa.  As a Minister, Haldane could not operate in departmental 
isolation and had to appease his Liberal colleagues’ desire for ‘peace, retrenchment and 
reform’, particularly their aspiration to reduce military expenditure.  Nonetheless, in a 
country where the Army was disliked, industrial unrest increasing, Irish civil war looming 
                                                          
6 R.B. Haldane, Richard Burdon Haldane. An Autobiography (Second edition, London: Hodder and  
Stoughton, 1929 [1929]), p.173 
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and proceedings in Parliament reduced to a mockery, Haldane, unlike the two previous 
Secretaries of State for War, was able to effect lasting reform. 7 
 
By the end of 1905, the War Office was agitated and preoccupied by the unsuccessful 
reforms of successive War Ministers in Balfour’s Unionist Cabinet.  The first was St John 
Brodrick, in post from November 1900 to October 1903, who had preconceived ideas on 
army reform.  He was a fervent believer in the Cardwell system, a means by which one of a 
pair of line battalions would remain at a depot in one of sixty-six territorial districts in the 
training and administrative role while the other battalion served overseas.8  He attempted 
reform while the Army was fighting in South Africa and, unlike his contemporaries, 
thought that the war had not exposed any shortcomings of it.9  His reforms proposed 
forming six self-contained Army Corps of 40,000 soldiers each, three comprising regular 
forces ready for immediate dispatch abroad and three comprising existing auxiliary forces 
for home defence.  To attract sufficient numbers of recruits, the basic rate of pay was 
increased and service with the colours reduced from seven years to three.  The reforms 
were expensive and increased the Estimates by nearly five and a half million pounds.10  
Apart from swelling the size of the Reserve, Brodrick was unable to improve recruiting and 
formed only three of the six corps.  A vain and sensitive man, Brodrick’s personality and 
character were described as ‘his own worst enemy’.11  He troubled the Admiralty who 
feared a reduction of their military hegemony and upset the auxiliary forces who foresaw a 
reduction in funding.  The Liberal Radicals viewed his militarism with contempt and the 
                                                          
7 E.M. Spiers, Haldane: an Army Reformer (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 1980), p.1 
8 E.M. Spiers, The Late Victorian Army, 1868 – 1902 (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1992), p.19 
9 Spiers, Haldane: an Army Reformer, p.4 
10 L.J. Satre, ‘St John Brodrick and Army Reform 1901-1903, The Journal of British Studies, Vol 15(2)  
(Spring 1976), pp.121-129 
11 Satre, ‘St John Brodrick and Army Reform 1901-1903’, p.131 
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Treasury became anxious about the increasing costs.  Accordingly, he lost the support of 
Cabinet, Parliament and the military and, compounded by his lack of political nous and 
weak leadership, his reforms failed.12  Balfour took the opportunity to replace him during a 
reshuffle of the Cabinet over Tariff Reform in October 1903.13 
 
His replacement, Arnold-Forster, opposed the Cardwell system and accepted that costs 
should be reduced but, like Brodrick, entered office with preconceived ideas which he was 
determined to implement.  Reversing most of Brodrick’s reforms, he proposed dividing the 
Army into two elements; long and short-service.  The long-service army would garrison 
India and the colonies and the short-service army would feed the Reserve.  Abandoning the 
Army Corps and three year term of service, he introduced nine year enlistments and 
proposed that the scheme be financed by deep cuts across the auxiliary forces.  The scheme 
encountered fierce opposition from the Cabinet, Parliament and the Army Council.  In 
Parliament, the Militia and Volunteer representatives protested and the Militia colonels 
were incensed that half of their battalions would be moved into the short-service army 
while the remainder were disbanded.  Without enjoying the support of his Prime Minister, 
Arnold-Forster was permitted to outline his reforms to Parliament in July 1904 but not 
commit the government to them.  Thereafter, military reform stalled due to Balfour’s 
unwillingness to appoint a new Secretary of State and Arnold-Forster’s intransigence.14  
Like Brodrick, Arnold-Forster’s time in post was flawed by lack of support and that ‘one of 
the greatest problems of Arnold-Forster had been the consistent opposition of the 
military’.15  With Arnold-Forster’s authority emasculated, Balfour involved himself 
                                                          
12 Satre, ‘St John Brodrick and Army Reform 1901-1903’, p.139 
13 Spiers, Haldane: an Army Reformer, pp.4-5 
14 Spiers, Haldane: an Army Reformer, pp.6-7 
15 B. Poe, ‘British Army Reforms 1902 – 1914’, Military Affairs, Vol 31(3) (Autumn 1967), p.135 
5 
 
increasingly with military matters until the fall of his government in December 1905.  
Against this background, Haldane had no choice other than to adopt a new approach to 
army reform.16  This perhaps answers the question why Haldane entered office declaring 
that he had no preconceived ideas about army reform when compelling documentary 
evidence, which is examined in Chapter Four, clearly suggests that he did.  
 
A review of the publications and research covering Haldane’s time in office indicates that 
an objective understanding of his reforms sits between two viewpoints; he was either a 
gifted intellect with a great capacity for original thought or ‘he had the lawyer’s habit of 
taking other men’s ideas’.17  Edward Spiers’ Haldane: an Army Reformer (1980), however, 
provides a balanced perspective of what he achieved.  He does not provide a biography of 
Haldane nor detail his time in the War Office but instead examines ‘the controversial and 
celebrated achievements of Haldane as an army reformer’.18  His meticulous and 
comprehensive approach to research revealed that instead of grand strategy and foreign 
policy being the key drivers of change, it was the economy.  Spiers argued that to appease 
the Liberal party, Haldane’s reforms could not cost any more than £28 million and that it 
was the ‘Economy and not Europe [that] had been the sine qua non of Haldane’s army 
reform’.19  While acknowledging the significance of Haldane’s reforms, Spiers contested 
that they contained less originality of thought than previously assumed and demonstrated 
that he inherited a considerable number of them from his predecessors and contemporaries.  
Spiers instead regarded Haldane’s capacity to implement reform, due to his perceptive 
judgement and strong leadership, as his lasting legacy.  Disappointingly, Spiers failed to 
                                                          
16 Spiers, Haldane: an Army Reformer, p.7 
17 P. Fraser, Lord Esher: A Political Biography (London: Hart-Davis MacGibbon, 1973), p.185 
18 Spiers, Haldane: an Army Reformer, p.V 
19 Spiers, Haldane: an Army Reformer, p.73 
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fully examine the influence that Haldane’s semester in Göttingen in 1874 and his lifelong 
admiration of German philosophy had on his reforms.  Andrew Vincent, however, argues 
convincingly that Haldane was guided by philosophy and that it provided him with a 
lifelong method of thinking and addressing problems.20  This criticism aside, Spiers’ 
comprehensive and detailed examination of Haldane’s reforms remains a seminal study. 
 
Haldane’s autobiography offers valuable evidence as to his early influences and 
development.  His analytical ability and questioning of first principles was much lauded 
and he only read first editions of books, as he considered later editions as being 
contaminated by those critics ‘who had half-obliterated the substance by bringing it up to 
date’.21  Despite Haldane’s openness regarding his relationship with his mother and his 
brief association with Miss Valentine Ferguson, Haldane does not reveal much about his 
relationship with his two most trusted political friends, Asquith and Grey.  The most 
surprising omissions, however, are those of Colonel Ellison and Lord Esher.  As Spiers 
argues, Ellison’s imprint is clearly visible in Haldane’s reforms yet he gave him little 
recognition, and Esher, who was one of the most influential figures of his time, received 
only passing references.  This omission continues in Haldane’s two principal biographies.  
The first, Major General Maurice’s Haldane: The Life of Viscount Haldane of Cloan 
(1937), when discussing the reforms, merely adhered to and expanded upon the themes in 
Haldane’s autobiography.   Unable to gain access to Cabinet papers or those of Haldane’s 
advisors, he simply reasserted the claims made by Haldane and failed to scrutinise relevant 
correspondence and memoirs.  He ignores the contribution of others and the work lapses 
                                                          
20 A. Vincent, ‘German Philosophy and British Public Policy: Richard Burdon Haldane in Theory and  
Practice’, Journal of the History of Ideas, Vol 68(1) (January 2007), p.179 
21 Haldane, Richard Burdon Haldane. An Autobiography, p.32 
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into a hagiography while affording ‘neither a comprehensive nor a dispassionate account of 
Haldane’s work as Secretary of State for War’.22  The second biography, Sommer’s 
Haldane of Cloan (1960) was published thirty-two years after Haldane’s death but a review 
of the Bibliography reveals that little was added from the additional primary material or 
secondary sources that materialised in the intervening years.  As with Maurice’s biography, 
there is significant duplication of the autobiography and consequently Sommer offers little 
additional insight into Haldane.  He contradicts himself in places and these errors reduce 
confidence in his analysis, which is compounded by the omission of any significant 
reference to Ellison and Esher. 
 
Peter Fraser’s scholarly Lord Esher: A Political Biography (1973) contends that the basis 
of the reforms was the product of Ellison and Esher, not Haldane.  James Lees-Milne’s The 
Enigmatic Edwardian: The Life of Reginald 2nd Viscount Esher (1986) supports this claim, 
adding that Balfour was also instrumental in them.  Fraser argues that Esher had significant 
influence in ministerial affairs because of the stabilising effect his immunity from the 
vagaries of the electorate and the exigencies of a political party afforded him.  
Unfortunately, this ‘authority without responsibility’ is not fully explored and Fraser does 
not adequately address how Esher was so adept at influencing foreign and domestic 
policy.23  He asserts that his authority came from his political reputation and multitude of 
social connections to influential circles but there were many at this time of whom the same 
could be said.  Esher, however, was certainly an influential figure and Fraser convincingly 
argues how considerable his impact was, especially his part in the establishment of secret 
                                                          
22 Spiers, Haldane: an Army Reformer, p.26 
23 In researching this dissertation, archival material and other related research has revealed that the political 
manoeuvrings and far-reaching influence of Lord Esher warrant renewed examination.  
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staff talks between the British and French in January 1906.  Esher’s foresight is rightly 
acknowledged because it was this single event that shaped the structure of the British Army 
in 1914.  Correlli Barnett’s assertion that without Esher, British military efforts would 
never have risen to and met the challenges of both world wars is attributing too much 
influence to him and he unfairly downplays Haldane’s part, whose task, he asserts, was 
merely ‘to implement the Esher Report’.24  Regardless of the origin of Haldane’s reforms, 
they did transform the regular and auxiliary forces of the military into an instrument 
capable of modern warfare.  It is not the purpose of this dissertation to detail and analyse 
the content of those reforms, but it is important to understand their significance.  To 
achieve this, their key characteristics are summarised below and, where necessary, 
expanded upon in subsequent chapters. 
 
Haldane entered office announcing that he had no thoughts on army reform and understood 
that his first task was to reduce costs.  Any restructuring of the Army had to conform to the 
limits of an arbitrary but politically acceptable annual ceiling of £28 million.  In order to 
reduce the Estimates, Haldane had to restructure a highly political organisation where there 
was little, if any, appetite for more reform.  Military reform was unpopular and while 
Parliament reflected national opinion in its desire to reduce defence spending, the social 
groups within the Army had a strong interest in preserving the status quo.25  Alerted by the 
Foreign Secretary, Sir Edward Grey, in January 1906 to the possibility of a German attack 
on France, his planning adopted a Continental perspective but did not ignore the more 
immediate imperial defence requirements.  He did this by restoring the Cardwell system, 
                                                          
24 C.D. Barnett, ‘Radical Reform:1902-14’, in A. Perlmutter and V.P. Bennett, eds., The Political Influence 
 of the Military A Comparative Reader (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1980), p.164 
25 M. Howard, Studies in War and Peace (London: Maurice Temple Smith Ltd, 1970), p.89 
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reverting to the old terms of service and balancing the seventy-one battalions at home with 
the eighty-five abroad.26  Assisted by his military Private Secretary, Colonel Gerald Ellison, 
Haldane established a two-line army; a Striking Force consisting six infantry divisions and 
one cavalry division, augmented by the Special Reserve, and the Territorial Force, formed 
from the Volunteers, Yeomanry and remaining elements of the Militia, which could expand 
and support the Striking Force in times of prolonged conflict.  In accepting the ‘Blue 
Water’ principle, a strategy of exclusive reliance on naval defences for safeguarding 
Britain’s home sovereignty,27 the Regular Army was released from a home defence role.  
Haldane incorporated existing rudimentary military organisations at universities and public 
schools into a newly formed Officer Training Corps (OTC) which, along with the 
Territorial Force, would be administered by the Country Associations thereby creating a 
British version of a nation in arms but without resorting to compulsory service.  Restricted 
by a cap on expenditure, Haldane’s army was the largest force that could be raised during 
peacetime and although a Continental threat provided it with a purpose, it neither 
determined its composition nor size.28 
 
Haldane’s achievements form a well-trodden historical path and there is no shortage of 
research and analysis detailing what he did and why.  This expansive body of research, 
however, does not adequately detail how Haldane was able to effect lasting change and a 
broad search has revealed only two pieces of academic research that attempt to understand 
this aspect of his reforms.  The first, Maud’s ‘Lord Haldane’s Reorganization of the British 
Army 1905-1912’ systematically analysed how Haldane approached the task and divided it 
                                                          
26 After adjustment, there were seventy-four battalions, both at home and abroad. 
27 S.E. Koss, Lord Haldane: Scapegoat for Liberalism (New York: Columbia University Press, 1969), p.58 
28 E.M. Spiers, ‘The Late Victorian Army 1868 – 1914’, in D. Chandler and I. Beckett, I. eds, The Oxford  
History of the British Army (Second edition, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2003 [1994]), pp.203-204 
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into five distinct stages.29  In applying a chronological template to the process, Maud 
simply reiterated what was done, by whom and when.  The second, Teagarden’s 
‘Management Lessons to be Learned from the Old Contemptibles’ updated Maud’s 
findings and, in an attempt to analyse Haldane’s management techniques, projected his 
actions onto an unspecified four-stage change organisation model.30  Apart from providing 
a useful synopsis on the development of change management methods, Teagarden did not 
offer any lessons as to how Haldane was able to effect lasting reform. This research, 
however, will do the reverse and apply a theoretical change management model 
retrospectively, not to constitute a modern change management consultancy but as a 
synchronic framework from which to conduct historical analysis and answer the question of 
how Haldane implemented change.  It will cut a new path in providing an alternate 
perspective of the Haldane Reforms and in doing so, it will not ‘point out lessons, but ...  
isolate things that need thinking about ... History provides insights and questions, not 
answers’.31  Taking this further, military history, if applied cautiously, provides a useful 
tool for decisions makers and ensures that they ask the right questions.  Nearly every 
situation will have had something similar to it occur in the past and careful study of it can 
provide useful prompts to those responsible for asking the questions.32  But history does not 
provide prescriptive lessons only ‘approximate precedents’33 and the purpose of this 
dissertation is to suggest what they are.  It will use a change management model as a 
vehicle for doing so because in reforming the British Army, Haldane implemented 
                                                          
29 P.D. Maud, ‘Lord Haldane’s Reorganization of the British Army 1905 – 1912’, Army Quarterly Vol 55 
 (October 1947), pp.48-50 
30 E. M. Teagarden, ‘Management Lessons to be Learned from the Old Contemptibles’, Journal of the Society 
 for Army Historical Research, Vol 75 (1997), pp.130-132 
31 G. Till, Maritime Strategy and the Nuclear Age (London: Macmillan, 1982), pp.224-225 
32 G. Sheffield, ‘Military Past, Military Present, Military Future. The Usefulness of Military History’, RUSI 
 Journal, Vol 153(3) (June 2008), p.102 
33 A. Gordon, The Rules of the Game: Jutland and British Naval Command (London: John Murray, 1996),  
p.600 
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institutional change.  Considering the impact of these reforms and their ramifications in 
1914, it is surprising that a retrospective analysis has not been conducted previously.  This 
would undoubtedly be of use to those today who find themselves in not too dissimilar a 
position to that of Haldane over a century ago.  This research will address that shortfall and 
to understand the significance of Haldane’s achievements, it is necessary first to understand 
what institutional change involves and why it presents such a monumental challenge. 
 
Change is inherently muddled, complicated and involves a wide range of conflicting 
demands.  Despite detailed planning, events rarely occur as predicted and are seldom 
correct in the first instance.  Large-scale change causes upheaval and creates new patterns 
of power, influence and control.  The challenge, therefore, is not only in changing an 
institution’s strategy, structure and output, but also in addressing the expectations, 
perceptions and performance of the individuals within it.34  Large-scale change is difficult 
to conceive because it deals with uncertainty and difficult to implement because 
consequences often arise that are unpredictable.  Furthermore, individuals or groups are 
inherently resistant to change and institutional change can fail simply because of this 
resistance.  Institutional change is therefore both an intellectual challenge and a process of 
dealing with people and uncertainty.35  Leading change is critical and only through strong 
leadership can barriers to change be removed and the motivation provided to change shared 
values and behavioural norms.36  But change must be deep-rooted because an institution 
can revert to its status quo if they are not entrenched in its culture.  This is known as 
homeostasis, where an organisation in response to radical change, has a tendency to revert 
                                                          
34 D.A. Nadler, Champions of Change (New York: John Wiley & Sons Inc, 1997), pp.3-5 
35 C. Carnall, Managing Change in Organisations (Fifth edition, Harwell: Pearson Education Ltd, 2007  
[1990]), pp.3-11 
36 J.P. Kotter, Leading Change (Boston: Harvard Business School Press, 1996), p.30 
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to its original state.  Kurt Lewin (1951) in his ‘Three-Step Change Model’ argued that a 
new state of equilibrium had to be moved towards and firmly established to prevent 
institutional homeostasis.37 
 
While change is unique to each organisation and does not always follow rigid academic 
models, scores of change management theories have developed over the years to help with 
the process.  Many have been successful to varying degrees and most could provide a 
useful framework with which to analyse an element of Haldane’s reforms.  One model, 
however, permits a comprehensive analysis and this is the Nadler and Tushman 
‘Congruence Model’.38  This dissertation neither endorses the Congruence Model nor 
argues that it is the only viable change model available but it has been selected specifically 
because it is a particularly useful tool for retrospectively analysing change and identifying 
why it succeeded or failed.  The Congruence Model regards organisations as a system of 
inter-related components that operate within a larger environment.39  It draws on their 
sociotechnical components and emphasises their interdependence.  The system responds to 
inputs from both internal and external sources and, using its strategy, transforms them into 
an output.  The transformation process comprises four interdependent elements, the work, 
the people, the formal organisation and the informal organisation and the model argues that 
effective change requires attending to all four components simultaneously.  Furthermore, it 
states that every element of the organisational system must be congruent in order to achieve 
                                                          
37 E. Cameron and M. Green, Making Sense of Change Management (London: Kogan Page Ltd, 2004), p.97 
38 The Congruence Model was developed by David Nadler, vice chairman of MMC, formerly Oliver Wyman 
Delta and Michael Tushman, Harvard Graduate Business School.  D.A. Nadler and M.L. Tushman, 
Competing by Design, (New York: Oxford University Press, 1997), pp.28-40 
39 J. Hayes, The Theory and Practice of Change Management (Second edition, Basingstoke: Palgrave  
Macmillan, 2007 [2002]), p.44 
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better performance as a whole.40  The concept of congruence is crucial to understanding 
this model.  In systems, the interaction of the component parts is more important than the 
components themselves, therefore an organisation’s overall effectiveness relies on the 
internal alignment of its basic parts.  This is the essence of the model; the greater the 
congruence the more effective an organisation will be in transforming strategy into 
performance.41  Fundamentally, the organisation’s formal structure must support the 
implementation of strategy but, just as importantly, the informal structure must align the 
work, people and culture with it.42  Haldane’s reforms predate the Congruence Model by 
some ninety years but he was aware that for lasting change to occur, all the elements within 
an organisation had to be addressed as a whole.  In his memorandum to the Army Council 
dated 1 January 1906, Haldane stated that 
The problem of the future reorganisation of the British Army can only be 
considered as a whole, ... it is fatal to try to deal with the parts of which one entire 
force is made up, without first determining their co-ordination on the broad 
principles according to which they are to be fitted into one another in the scheme as 
a whole.43   
 
Using the Congruence Model as a framework to analyse Haldane’s reforms, the dissertation 
is divided into three main segments: Organisation Components, Operating Organisation and 
Operating Environment.  Chapter Two looks at the Organisation Components of the British 
Army; these are the elements that constitute the basic components of any organisation and 
include its environment, resources, history and strategy.  These four components are 
                                                          
40 Cameron and Green, Making Sense of Change Management, pp.104-106 
41 Nadler, Champions of Change, pp.37-38 
42 Nadler and Tushman, Competing by Design, pp.34-40 
43 Haldane Mss., NLS, Ms. 5918, pp.44-45 
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bequeathed by the outgoing leader of an organisation and this chapter will examine how 
Haldane configured his inheritance and interpreted the environment to produce a response.  
It will explore how Haldane balanced retrenchment with reform, Continental commitment 
with Imperial defence, fighting overseas with home defence, compulsion with voluntary 
service and foreign policy with his admiration for Germany.  Chapter Three examines the 
Operating Organisation of the British Army.  This is the transformation mechanism that 
takes the strategy, in the context of environment, resources and history and converts it into 
an output.  The mechanism comprises the work, formal organisation, people and informal 
organisation components and it is here that congruence is essential for institutional change 
to succeed.  This chapter will demonstrate that Haldane understood the social and technical 
dimensions of change and will examine how he attempted to align them.  It will analyse 
how Haldane’s keen interest in science, technology and education lead him to create the 
nation in arms concept.  Chapter Four focuses on the British Army’s Operating 
Environment and resistance to change.  Barriers to change can stall or prevent institutional 
change, therefore predicting and learning to overcome them is vital if change is to 
succeed.44  Haldane’s leadership was critical in addressing the Army’s inherent resistance 
and this chapter focuses on his personal and professional qualities.  It also analyses his 
relationship with his key advisors and re-examines the debate about whether he had 
preconceived ideas about army reform before taking office. 
                                                          
44 Nadler, Champions of Change, p.212 
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CHAPTER TWO 
ORGANISATION COMPONENTS 
‘It is a story of an effort made in two directions, that of 
averting a possible calamity and that of preparing for it 
should it happen’45 
 
Upon hearing of Haldane’s appointment, Haig remarked to his wife that he ‘cannot be 
worse than Arnold-Forster and must have some pluck to take over the post of Secy. of 
War'.46  Haldane became Secretary of State for War at a time when the War Office was still 
regarded as the graveyard of a promising politician’s career, particularly for a Liberal 
Imperialist whose party was generally anti-militaristic.  Many of his predecessors, such as 
Hartington and Campbell-Bannerman had come to the War Office unwillingly and others, 
including Stanhope and Arnold-Forster, left with their health affected by the stress of 
working there.  The War Office was regarded as a ministry that endured a chaotic state of 
administration, over-bearing Commanders-in-Chief (C-in-C), rivalries between civilian and 
military advisors, a lack of reliable and independent advice and the contempt of an 
increasingly important Treasury whose hostility towards the military was readily 
apparent.47  It was not until the debacle of the South African War that major faults at the 
higher levels of military administration were highlighted and addressed, particularly the 
lack of a professional consultative agency and the failure of communication between 
politicians and soldiers.  Until coordination was improved, diplomacy and strategy could 
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never be correlated.48  The ensuing inquests and reforms, the culmination of which was the 
War Office Reconstitution Committee (WORC), had, by 1905, abolished the post of C-in-C 
and replaced it with the new position of Chief of the General Staff, defined the duties of the 
members of the Army Council, established the Committee of Imperial Defence (CID) and 
created, only on paper at this stage, a General Staff.49  These developments strengthened 
the relevance and responsibilities of the civilian head of the ministry and, perhaps more 
importantly, provided the Secretary of State with an emerging system capable of imparting 
cohesive advice on strategic matters for the first time.50  Fortunately for Haldane, this 
coincided with the demise of Balfour’s Unionist government at the end of 1905.  Hampered 
by a lack of political and military support, his Unionist predecessors, Brodrick and Arnold-
Forster, had failed in their attempts to implement effective army reform but had succeeded 
in leaving a dysfunctional War Office that was divided, lacking direction and demoralised. 
 
Arnold-Forster passed to Haldane an army that was structured for an ambiguous and 
unclear purpose.  Nadler states in Champions of Change (1997) that for any organisation to 
operate effectively, its basic structure must have three functioning Organisational 
Components.51  These are its input, strategy and output.  The input comprises the 
organisation’s resources, history and environment and are bequeathed to each new leader 
when control of an organisation changes.  The resources are those assets which have value 
with regards to the opportunities, demands and constraints imposed upon it.  They can be 
tangible such as equipment and personnel or intangible such as reputation but generally the 
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organisation’s finances are regarded as its key resource.  An organisation’s history is 
composed of those past events, crises and activities that have shaped the way it operates.  
The environment consists of all the forces, conditions and key figures operating outside the 
boundaries of the organisation which place demands upon it, particularly where it sits 
within a larger framework.  Where this is the case, the impetus for major institutional 
change normally originates in a response to pressure imposed upon it by the external 
environment.  The ensuing strategy represents the decisions made by the leader about how 
to configure the resources in response to the demands, constraints and opportunities of the 
environment, within the context of the organisation’s history, to produce the output.  The 
output, the ultimate purpose of any organisation, draws on the patterns of behaviour, 
activities and the performance of the system.  When a gap exists between the organisation’s 
strategy and its output, radical change is required if the organisation is to function 
effectively.52  This was the condition of the War Office in December 1905 and in a letter to 
his mother, Haldane complained that ‘my predecessor has left me many embarrassments’,53 
chief among which was an organisation that had an inconsistent strategy which did not 
adequately reflect the environment within which it operated.  This chapter will examine 
how Haldane interpreted that environment and responded to the external demands placed 
upon the War Office in producing a suitable response. 
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Figure 1: The Congruence Model54   
Copyright © 1998 by John Wiley & Sons, Inc.  Reprinted with permission of 
John Wiley & Sons, Inc. 
 
Strategy, as shown in the Congruence Model at Figure 1, is the means by which an input is 
converted into an output using the technical and social dimensions of an organisation.  In 
the case of an army, however, the output is normally predetermined along with funding and 
manpower levels.  Furthermore, as an organ of state, the environment in which an army 
operates is very much influenced by the larger governmental framework and its foreign, 
imperial and domestic policy.  For a leader of such an organisation, where the output and 
majority of the input are fixed, the adjustment of the organisation’s strategy is the only 
means by which the system can convert an input into an output.  Haldane, however, under 
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the same constraints, did the reverse; using the strategy, he adjusted the output to suit the 
input.  Political expediency demanded that he decrease the Estimates and he reduced the 
input first and then made the output fit the funding available.  While Haldane never 
admitted this, claiming instead considerable credit for his foresightedness and good 
judgement, Edward Spiers in his insightful Haldane: an Army Reformer (1980) argues 
convincingly that this was the case.  Economy and not Europe underpinned Haldane’s 
military and strategic planning.55 
 
Accepting that a reduction in the Estimates was his primary motive and that any subsequent 
restructuring of the British Army was modelled on the resources that remained, Haldane 
took steps to define a clear role and purpose for it.  Assuring Lord Rosebery that the 
business of reforming the War Office was achievable, Haldane also informed him that he 
had begun a thorough survey of the Army ‘with a view of getting in the end a definite 
objective’.56  In his first speech as Secretary of State to Parliament on 8 March 1906, he 
said that ‘the first thing we want is absolutely clear thinking about the purposes for which 
the Army exists and the principles on which it is to be organised’.57  He understood that this 
would take time and confided to his mother that to ‘hurry would be dangerous’,58 while 
warning Parliament that ‘to make plans in haste is to repent of them at leisure’.59  The task 
of reviewing the purpose of the Army was undertaken throughout the Christmas 
Parliamentary recess at his family home at Cloan and at his constituency in Haddington 
during the January 1906 general election campaign.  Haldane was assisted in this process 
by his newly appointed military Private Secretary, Colonel Gerald Ellison, who had been 
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recommended to him by both Esher and Sir George Clarke.60  Haldane’s reason for 
conducting the review in Scotland was so that he could be less accessible.  Upon taking 
office, he was inundated with papers and letters offering suggestions as to how he should 
best reform the Army but he wished to consider these questions away from any interference 
and ‘with an open mind’.61  One letter came from Arnold-Forster who made several 
suggestions then concluded the letter by stating that Haldane and the Liberal Party would 
be ‘much freer than mine from all the social influences, class influences and other 
detestable sources of confusion with which I have had to contend’.62  While this statement 
would prove to be wrong, in that Haldane did have to face the same influences and sources 
of confusion, it reveals much about Arnold-Forster’s character.  Haldane was to succeed 
where Arnold-Forster had failed because he was able to withstand the influences and 
pressures, both subtle and obvious, that individuals placed upon him.  Drawing on his 
philosophical and legal training, Haldane studied a problem then synthesised the rational 
and constructive ideas of his and others around him into a solution.63  Haldane’s failing in 
this regard was that he would later claim these ideas wholly his own and pay little or no 
credit to those who had assisted him. 
 
In addition to providing impetus for reform of the War Office, the South African War also 
exposed the weakness of Britain’s policy of ‘Splendid Isolation’ and was followed by six 
years of unprecedented diplomatic activity.64  Britain’s isolation during the war strained its 
international standing and the growing economic challenges presented by Russia, Germany 
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and the United States, in addition to the traditional rivalry with France, encouraged the state 
to reconsider its traditional approach to diplomacy.  As a consequence, renewed emphasis 
was placed upon the consolidation of empire and the removal of sources of agitation with 
other powers.  Under these conditions, between 1902 and 1907 the United Kingdom 
entered into an alliance with Japan and signed ententes with France and Russia.65  The 
entente with Russia was negotiated by the Liberal Foreign Secretary, Sir Edward Grey, in 
an attempt to maintain the balance of power in Europe, which he hoped would give British 
diplomacy greater strength and flexibility in dealing with the increasing threat of 
Germany’s naval programme.66 
 
Grey, who was a close friend of Haldane and a fellow Liberal Imperialist, became Foreign 
Secretary at a time of transformation in the Foreign Office when a new socially 
homogenous group of men assumed the most important departmental positions and 
ambassadorial posts in Europe.  Chief amongst these was Sir Charles Hardinge, the newly 
appointed Permanent Under-Secretary who had previously been Britain’s ambassador in 
Russia.  A lifelong diplomat, Hardinge knew most of his counterparts in Europe and was 
close friends with King Edward VII and his private secretary, Sir Francis Knollys.  Grey 
and Hardinge worked well together and the Foreign Secretary relied on the invaluable and 
trusted advice of his chief assistant.  Hardinge was convinced that German strength was a 
major threat to British interests and he played a key part in influencing Grey’s foreign 
policy, which identified Britain’s key strategic interest as the maintenance of the balance of 
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power in Europe.67  Grey, a risk-averse and cautious individual, placed great importance on 
the continuity of foreign policy and was keen to dispel the misconception that a Liberal 
government would upset his Unionist predecessor’s entente with France.  If the entente 
were allowed to collapse, Britain would be isolated internationally and susceptible to 
pressure from other powers.  If, however, the entente was preserved, Britain would retain 
its new found position as the linchpin of European politics.  Britain therefore needed to 
exert a calming influence in Paris and a restraining influence in Berlin.  Against this 
political background and in the aftermath of the First Moroccan Crisis, which saw a rift 
develop in Franco-German relations, Grey met Haldane at Berwick on 12 January 1906 to 
discuss the possibility of a Continental conflict and authorised secret, informal talks 
between the Director of Military Operations and the French military attaché in London.68  
Writing to his mother that evening, Haldane, understating somewhat the severity of the 
situation, remarked ‘I am a little uneasy about the relations of France and Germany.  I hope 
the friction will pass away’.69 
 
As early as January 1905, in seeking a role for the Army, the embryonic General Staff had 
seized upon the opportunity presented by the entente to plan for the despatching of a force 
to the Continent.  Wargaming identified that military intervention would be more effective 
if a British army directly supported a French army rather than conducting independent 
amphibious operations on the German coast but, paradoxically, it also identified that the 
small size and slow mobilisation of the Army would have insufficient impact on the 
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outcome of the campaign.  With Britain committed to an amphibious strategy and with no 
political commitment to the military support of France, the findings were purely 
hypothetical.  A year later, however, when a sub-committee of the CID met to review 
Britain’s strategic options, it was this plan for direct intervention on the Continent that was 
endorsed.  Although this Continental strategy was never adopted as official strategy, the 
General Staff chose to interpret this as such and the politically sanctioned staff talks with 
the French in January 1906 only served to reinforce this view.70  There is much debate as to 
when the General Staff adopted a Continental strategy; some historians contest that it was 
as early as 1904 when the shift had switched from expecting to fight a war with Russia in 
India to that of fighting a war with Germany in Europe to as late as August 1911 when 
Brigadier-General Henry Wilson convinced the CID to adopt the French version of the 
Continental commitment.71  What is certain, however, is that in January 1906, Haldane was 
requested by the Foreign Secretary to consider a campaign plan for a war against Germany 
in Europe and that his General Staff had already devised a plan for such an event.  Both the 
General Staff and the diplomats had determined that Britain’s next war would be with 
Germany. 
 
In turning his attention to the Continent, Haldane could not ignore the needs of an empire 
which required an army to reinforce British troops in India and Egypt and relieve troops in 
the Colonies.72  Haldane, however, was the first Secretary of State for War who did not 
have to contend with the possibility of invasion.  In February 1903, the CID under the 
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chairmanship of Balfour established a sub-committee to examine this risk of invasion 
which quickly reached the conclusion that there was no serious threat.  Having calculated 
that an invasion force would require at least 70,000 men, 200 boats to transport them and 
72 hours to deploy, their logistics and transportation could be completely disrupted by the 
Royal Navy.73  This verdict was viewed as a triumph by the ‘Blue Water’ school, who 
regarded a powerful navy as a guarantee against invasion, over the ‘Bolt from the Blue’ 
cohort, who feared a surprise attack by a Continental neighbour and used this as a base on 
which to campaign for a large, conscripted army.74  In a speech delivered shortly after this 
statement was made, Balfour emphasised that Britain’s utmost difficulty lay not in defence 
of the nation but in overseas action.  From this point onwards, the naval doctrine of 
command of the sea in relation to how it impacted upon overseas garrisons and home 
defence became increasingly accepted by those within the War Office.75  Haldane, who had 
publicly sided with the ‘Blue Water’ school, based his reforms on this principle.76  If, 
however, Haldane was freed from retaining an army for home defence, there were other 
locations that a striking force may be required.  A report submitted by the Director of 
Military Operations to Haldane on 4 January 1906, suggested that in addition to sending up 
to 100,000 troops to India in response to Russian aggression, Britain might also have to 
send major forces to quell an uprising of Boers in South Africa, war with France, war in an 
alliance with France against Germany, war with the United States and a number of small 
colonial wars.  Haldane therefore had to contend with the immediate concerns of both 
Continental war and defence of the Empire when devising his new scheme.77  He had found 
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the answer to his question of what the British Army’s purpose was; ‘the answer was a very 
simple one.  It was for war overseas’.78 
 
 
Despite Balfour’s 1903 statement that the threat of invasion was negligible, the National 
Service League (NSL), an organisation founded in 1902 to lobby for the introduction of 
Universal Training,79 did not relax in its efforts to change Britain’s military structure.  
Boasting prominent members such as Lord Curzon, Lord Milner, Rudyard Kipling and 
Leopold Amery, the League received a fillip in 1905 when Lord Roberts resigned in 
frustration from the CID, due to the government’s intransigence on compulsory service, and 
became president of the NSL.  A national hero, such was his fame that he attracted 
significant useful media attention and under his leadership the membership of the League 
increased significantly.  Roberts argued that Universal Training or National Service as it 
was also known, would, after a period of short training, provide a cohort of young men 
capable of defending Britain’s shores.  Exclusively structured for home defence, this large 
Continental-scale force would free the Royal Navy and Regular Army to fight overseas, 
reinforce the Regular Army during war and provide moral, social, economic and physical 
benefit to the nation.  The League’s strategy was to create mass support and change public 
opinion in addition to influencing the key military and political decision makers.80  The 
majority of the League’s political support came from the Unionists, but from the 
backbenches as the Party leaders would not adopt compulsory training as policy.  The 
Liberal Radicals and the emerging Labour Party, which feared that Britain would become 
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too militaristic, were vehemently opposed and denounced the scheme as jingoistic.81  
Confusingly, Roberts favoured conscription based on the Continental model above that of 
Universal Training to better prepare Britain for a European war.82  Ellison claimed that this 
was a view shared ‘by practically all thinking soldiers who took part in the Boer War 
[including], to my certain knowledge, Douglas Haig’.83  Haldane, however, was not 
convinced that the League’s scheme was politically practicable or advisable militarily and 
no amount of argument changed their respective views.84  Whether compulsory training or 
conscription was better suited to prepare Britain for Continental warfare, Haldane’s 
proposed reforms of the auxiliary forces took the wind, albeit temporarily, out of the 
League’s sails.  The Territorial Force’s role was the same as the League’s proposed national 
service army; both were primarily for home defence, both would reinforce the Regular 
Army and both would attempt to unite army and nation.85  In seeking his Liberal 
Parliamentary colleagues support for this new force, Haldane shrewdly presented it as a 
‘practical test of the voluntary system so that its very existence could be interpreted as an 
obstacle to compulsion’.86   
 
Writing privately to Lord Kitchener in 1906, Esher stated that he thought Haldane’s scheme 
was ‘the last chance [that] will ever be given to the voluntary system.  It may succeed up to 
a certain point ... but more than likely it will fail, and in that case, behind our garrison 
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Army we must have a National Army on the compulsory basis’.87  Esher, an important 
confidant of Haldane but an ardent supporter of compulsion, publically supported the 
Territorial Force.  He believed that its inevitable failure would finally convince Parliament 
to adopt compulsory service and, in an attempt to soften its imposition on the British 
public, it could be introduced at regional level and structured on the defunct County 
Associations.88  A naturally cautious individual, Haldane knew that his radical ideas would 
run into difficulty and he sought the help of Esher.  An influential and skilful courtier, he 
enjoyed the confidence and trust of King Edward VII and of almost anyone else of 
significance in public life; he was very much the ‘éminence grise of Edwardian politics’.89  
Within weeks of taking office, Haldane wanted Esher to ‘organise a series of private talks 
[with him] at the CID Office.  It is the only way of keeping ideas clear and working out 
large plans’.90  These were successful and six weeks later Haldane reported to Esher that 
‘our ideas seem to be running on the same lines’.91  Although not a creator of original 
thought, Esher was an insightful judge of ideas and Haldane thought his independent 
position, one which was without party politics, could offer balanced judgement.  More 
importantly, his social standing would prove most useful in smoothing tension or allaying 
concerns between the War Office, the auxiliary forces and the King.92  Esher was only too 
pleased to help Haldane.  As will be discussed in Chapter Four, he saw it as a means of 
‘nobbling’ him and influencing the direction of his reforms.  Lees-Milne’s aptly titled 
biography, The Enigmatic Edwardian (1986), neatly encapsulates the Janus-faced nature of 
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Esher’s character.  In 1909, for example, he formed a secret patriotic organisation called the 
‘Society of Islanders’ which acknowledged that Germany would be the enemy in any future 
war and promoted a ‘two keels to one’ standard for the Royal Navy.93  Two years later, 
however, in 1911 he became chairman of the British section of the King Edward VII 
Foundation, an Anglo-German institution in memory of the King, which provided funding 
to assist Germans living in Britain.94  The German section, which did likewise for British 
subjects, was chaired by Albert Ballin, a friend of Haldane.95  On one hand, Esher was 
attempting to better prepare the nation for war with Germany yet on the other, he was 
endeavouring to encourage stronger cultural and diplomatic ties between them. 
 
It is ironic that Haldane, who admired Germany, became Secretary of State for War at a 
time when both the Foreign Office and War Office were uniting in their purpose against 
that nation.  Having made several good friends while studying at the University of 
Göttingen during 1874, in the years afterwards he returned many times on holiday to visit 
them and immerse himself in his passion for philosophy.  When in office, these visits 
continued in an official manner, the most notable being the visit at the behest of the 
German Emperor in 1906 and the official state visit of King Edward VII in 1909.  While a 
letter to his lifelong friend Hugo Conwentz in 1874 claiming that he wished he ‘had been 
born a German for Germany suits me far more than here’96 could be explained by youthful 
exuberance, a letter written to Conwentz thirty-three years later is perhaps a more reliable 
indicator of Haldane’s true feelings towards Germany.   Thanking him for his Christmas 
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present, he concludes the letter saying ‘you know how deep my respect is for your country 
and how much I owe to it’.97  Germany even pervaded his life sufficiently enough for him 
to name his Labrador after the Kaiser!98 The German newspapers regarded Haldane highly 
and one article in 1906 declared that he was ‘a good friend of Germany, who was educated 
among us, and cares for us’.99  It was this mutual admiration that would fuel the cries of his 
political enemies that he was a pro-German sympathiser which led to his omission from the 
coalition government in 1915. 
 
Shaped primarily by the need to reduce the Army Estimates to below £28 million, 
Haldane’s reformed army had one clear purpose – to fight overseas.  Its declared primary 
task was to ‘maintain the defence of an Empire which extends over twelve millions of 
square miles ...’,100 but it would be needed to fight much closer to home.  To do this, 
Haldane would create an Army of two lines; the regular first line of the Expeditionary 
Force immediately available for mobilisation overseas supported by the auxiliary second 
line of the Territorial Force for home defence and expansion.  Advised by those closest to 
him that war with Germany was inevitable, yet constrained by the voluntary system, 
Haldane attempted to create a uniquely British solution, a ‘nation in arms’ that would draw 
‘on the most fighting nation on earth’.101  This professional force, he hoped, would match 
the mass conscript armies of Europe. 
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CHAPTER THREE 
OPERATING ORGANISATION 
‘What had to be done was to take the old-fashioned British Army 
and to rid it of superfluous fat, to develop muscle in place of 
mere flesh, and to put the whole force in proper training’102 
 
Within a few weeks of becoming Secretary of State for War, Haldane had laid the 
foundations of his strategic role for the Army.  The CID had convinced him that the danger 
of invasion was negligible and political developments since the signing of the entente in 
April 1904 indicated the need for an Expeditionary Force that could fight on the Continent 
or elsewhere.103  These foundations, however, were laid on a base of retrenchment within 
the War Office.  Haldane, by imposing a ceiling of £28 million for the Estimates, had set a 
mandatory financial limit first and then reorganised the existing forces to fulfil the strategic 
requirements.  His political concern for economy and efficiency had underpinned strategic 
and military planning.104  With his freedom of manoeuvre hamstrung by the Liberal party’s 
desire for retrenchment and its aversion to compulsion, Haldane, through the War Office’s 
‘Operating Organisation’ had still to develop and shape an army that was capable of 
delivering an output. 
 
Nadler asserts that the ‘Operating Environment’ is at the very heart of the Congruence 
Model because it transforms the strategy of an institution, in the context of history, 
resources and environment and converts it into an output.  Its four major components 
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comprise the institution’s work; people; formal organisational arrangements; and informal 
organisational arrangements.  The interaction of the component parts is more important 
than the components themselves, therefore an organisation’s overall effectiveness relies on 
the internal alignment of its basic parts.  These four components fall under the two axes of 
an institution; the technical dimension which comprises the work and formal organisation 
and the social dimension which comprises the people and the informal organisation.105  The 
technical or social dimension cannot be ignored during institutional change and this chapter 
will demonstrate how Haldane attempted to address both in his reforms. 
 
Colonel Ellison, Haldane’s private Military Secretary for three years, regarded him ‘first 
and foremost [as] an educationist (sic)’.106  Haldane, who had supported Balfour’s London 
Universities Act of 1898 and Government Education Act of 1902 against his own party, 
was a proponent of higher education and was committed to the principle of educational 
reform.  He regarded the development of the education system as a method of counteracting 
the more radical demands for social change and, perhaps more importantly, a means of 
meeting the national challenge from Germany.107  Haldane was concerned about the 
differences in attitude regarding education between Germany and Britain, especially in 
technical education and research.  There existed a laissez-faire attitude towards science and 
technology within the education, industry and business communities and he, along with 
other reformers, feared for ‘Britain’s future international security, her ability in the long 
term to feed and house her growing population adequately, and the value of the pragmatism 
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and amateurism which played such a large role in Britain’s business and political life’.108  
But, after the landslide election victory of January 1906, education reform became absorbed 
within the myriad social reforms launched by the Liberal party and supported by the 
nascent Labour party.109   As Ensor argued in England 1870 – 1914 (1936), the House of 
Commons was heady with ‘Radicalism and Socialism alike, released from the suppression 
of two decades ... [and] radiant with sudden hopes of a new heaven and a new earth’.110  
When Haldane was appointed Secretary of State for War in the new government, he 
regarded army reform as part of this wider Liberal reform programme and did not view it in 
isolation.111  He linked the study of the Army’s organisation to that of any other scientific 
problem and, more importantly, to wider contemporary social issues.  Addressing 
Parliament on 8 March 1906, he remarked that 
The Army touches social questions in the closest way.  The relations of capital and 
labour, the whole problem of education, the topic of temperance, the science of 
medicine, questions relating to the Empire ... and, last, but not least, the science of 
economy.112 
Later, in the same speech, he expanded this point further linking the Army to the nation and 
suggesting that the solution to some of its problems had hitherto been ignored: 
I think the Army problem has been studied too much apart from its social and non-
military aspects, from the aspect in which it touches the life of the country, from the 
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aspect in which it touches tradition and sentiment.  All this you have to bring on 
your side if you would solve the problem.113 
Haldane, in adopting a scientific approach to change and acknowledging that wider social 
issues impacted upon the efficiency and output of the military, demonstrated that he 
understood the need to reform both the technical and social dimensions of the Army.  He 
realised, for example, that recruitment levels were dependent upon the general state of the 
nation’s economy and that a broader educational programme would help the Army keep 
pace with technological advancements on the battlefield.114  Constrained by a mandatory 
financial ceiling of £28 million and the political obligation to retain a voluntary system, 
Haldane’s solution to the problem was to move away from the supplementation of the 
Regular Army in times of crisis by various categories of reserve.  Instead, he envisaged an 
entire nation in arms but not one based on a Continental system, where compulsion fed its 
ranks and the army acted as the nation’s school in both military and moral education, but 
one that was unique to Britain, drawing its number by voluntary means and rooted in 
traditional institutions.115 
 
Haldane compared his concept of a nation in arms to that of a metal cone.  The regulars 
would comprise ‘a sharp point of finely tempered steel’ backed by a second line of troops 
(the Special Reserve) and reinforced ultimately by a broad base of support and expansion 
(the Territorial Force).  He asserted that the reorganisation would elevate the status of 
military service, improve the efficiency of the auxiliary forces and provide a method of 
military expansion through the development of rifle clubs and school and officer cadet 
corps.  This, he asserted, would weld the nation and Army together, conscious of the 
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demands of imperial defence.  In promoting this concept, Haldane was not only trying to 
reform the Army but also the public’s attitude towards it.  He had perceived during the 
South African War that the conduct of war and the Army’s role in it required both social 
consent and political cohesion.  A Liberal Imperialist, he had supported the military effort 
in South Africa but was fully aware of the fervour and angst evoked in the majority of his 
Liberal colleagues and in those elements of society who were vehemently against the war.  
By creating a nation in arms, he hoped to avoid a repeat of such feelings and bitter 
divisions.116  Worried that his Liberal colleagues may consider it too militaristic, Haldane 
assured them that the decentralised Territorial Force would be governed by elected people 
in County Associations.  These territorially based organisations, comprising representatives 
from business, industry, trade unions and town councils would control the day-to-day 
running of their county’s units and be responsible for administering them.117  He 
guaranteed that ‘no war would be entered upon without the full consent of the people.  A 
nation under arms in that fashion would be a nation under arms for the sake of peace and 
not for the sake of war’.118 
 
When Haldane took office, a contemporary claimed that ‘the military forces of the Crown 
could be described, without exaggeration, as a chaotic assemblage of fragments incapable 
of mobilisation’.119   The military’s first line, the Regular Army which was based on a 
Continental Army Corps system, was under-resourced, under-manned and lacked the 
requisite commanders and staff for war.  The Militia, which formed the second line and was 
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drained by the Regular Army in peace to make up shortfalls, was under no obligation to 
serve abroad during war.  The third line comprised the Volunteers and Yeomanry and vied 
with the Militia for the best recruits.  The Volunteers existed at battalion level only and 
were distributed around the country without any regard for military necessity.  The three 
lines had no clearly defined functions, were disparate and, in time of crisis, were not a 
reliable means by which the Regular Army could be expanded. 120  Haldane foresaw the 
social difficulties in reforming these traditional institutions, reporting in his autobiography 
that  
These heterogeneous corps had histories and traditions and people who had been 
associated with and were devotedly attached to them.  To break with tradition and 
weld their substance into something quite novel was likely to be a very serious 
undertaking.121 
 
Haldane attempted to create order out of this ‘chaotic assemblage’ in two ways; 
reinvigorating the War Office and transforming the fighting forces.  The Royal Navy’s 
hegemony in the defence establishment had seen the Admiralty brought into close 
cooperation with the CID, which ‘contrasted with the most childish jealousy and 
obstruction of the War Office and General Staff’;122 an organisation and staff which 
Haldane inherited in December 1905.  In the aftermath of the Army’s poor performance in 
South Africa, successive Unionist Secretaries of State for War had set out on paths of 
reform to overhaul the Army’s organisation.   Reorganisation, as a word, became banal and 
misunderstood in the years that followed, creating as many proposals as it had meanings.  
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Arnold-Forster, who had previously served in the Admiralty, came to the War Office in 
1903 with his own preconceived ideas of reform which were based on reductions of the 
Army’s presence overseas.  These ideas conflicted with those of a new breed of 
professional soldier in the General Staff who were attempting to create a modern army 
which would put it on an equal footing with its Continental neighbours.  These ‘thinking 
soldiers’ had grown impatient of the inefficiency of the old British Army, which was 
content to maintain support for an amphibious strategy and remain subordinate to the Royal 
Navy both in strategic role and in the nation’s affection.  While Strachan and Gooch 
dismiss his assertion that the War Office adopted a Continental strategy as early as 1906,123 
d’Ombrain correctly paints a picture of the abysmal state of affairs in the War Office, 
where the Secretary of State and his disjointed military advisors openly bickered and 
‘marked a truly dismal interlude in the history of the British Army’.124 
 
Haldane placated this group as soon as he was in office by informing them that he had no 
preconceived ideas of reform and that he wanted time to listen to their advice and consider 
what reforms were necessary.  By February 1906 he received their support for the cessation 
of his predecessor’s reforms and he purged the Army Council of those he considered to be 
opposed to reform.125  Divulging to Lord Rosebery, the Liberal Imperialists’ patriarch, his 
initial thoughts upon taking office, Haldane reported ‘I have eliminated from the Council 
one man who was better for the field than for the office and brought in Sir Wm Nicholson – 
an acute brain – but not a very easy man.  Still I need him badly.’126  Haldane had removed 
General Herbert Plumer, who would later command the British Second Army in Flanders 
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for two years and achieve an overwhelming victory at the Battle of Messines in June 1917.  
Plumer’s misfortune was that he was the only member of the Army Council who had seen 
merit in Arnold-Forster’s reform proposals.127  Two months later, Haldane told Esher that 
‘you will be glad to hear that I have practically settled things for Douglas Haig.  We want 
Haig badly, (1) he has brains, (2) he is a cavalry man (sic)’.128  Furthermore, after Arnold-
Forster’s procrastination, Haldane constituted the General Staff in September 1906, having 
amended the draft Army Order to assuage Esher’s concerns over the Chief of the General 
Staff’s role in making staff appointments.  He also extended the General Staff to the 
commands and districts where, as a general rule, only those individuals who had passed 
Staff College (psc) would serve as staff officers.129   
 
Haldane had revitalised the Army’s brain and surrounded by a core of forward thinking, 
professionally-minded psc officers, he set about reorganising the Army’s body.  He 
benefitted by having at his disposal a cohort of highly intelligent and capable staff officers, 
which included Haig, Nicholson, Grierson, Hamilton and Wilson, all of whom made or 
enhanced their reputations in his administration.130  His reforms provided a role of 
significance for the ‘Continental School’ who were content to approve reductions overseas 
in order to establish the Expeditionary Force at home.131  Haldane had succeeded where 
Arnold-Forster and Brodrick had failed; he had won the support of his military officials and 
the organisation he was attempting to reform.  Writing to Lord Knollys, private secretary to 
King Edward VII, Esher commented that ‘after twenty-five years of experience of War 
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Ministers, I can truthfully say he is most popular with senior officers  ... [and that] the 
Officers of the Army realise he is their friend; he has not worried them, and he has 
supported them.132 
 
To transform the fighting force into one that could implement its new strategic role, 
Haldane’s technical reforms created two fighting lines, each with clearly defined functions.  
The Striking Force, or Expeditionary Force as it became known, was based on six self-
sufficient divisions, each with their own cavalry, transport, medical support and supply 
services, and a cavalry division, all capable of rapid mobilisation and concentration.  The 
Special Reserve, which replaced the Militia, was designed to supplement the Expeditionary 
Force in certain specialist areas upon mobilisation but was primarily to cover wastage 
during the first months of a prolonged conflict.133  Returning to the Cardwell system of 
paired battalions, Haldane reorganised the home-based battalions into large divisions which 
were capable of adjusting rapidly from conditions of peace to participation in war.134  
Spiers, however, regards this as a short-sighted decision based not on the likely nature of a 
future Continental war but on previous tactical experience in South Africa where the Army 
had operated in smaller units and also on the need to unify the structures of the home army 
and army in India ‘should the two ... ever be required to act together’.135  Conversely, Hew 
Strachan states that the Army Corps concept was rejected because its adoption would have 
constrained the Army to preparing for one contingency only, Continental warfare.136  
Whereas the large conscript armies of Europe were based on the Army Corps system, 
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Britain’s Army reverted to large divisions in order to fulfil their Imperial obligations, while 
its senior planners on the General Staff were planning and preparing for a Continental War.  
An uncertain future does not afford the military planner certainty and the resultant 
adaptable and flexible force held ready to deal with it is expensive; Haldane’s 
reorganisation of the formal structure of the Regular Army was an attempt to balance these 
two irredeemable demands.  
 
Haldane’s second line was the Territorial Force which would both support and expand the 
Regular Army in war and contained fourteen infantry divisions and fourteen cavalry 
brigades, complete with supporting arms.  Organised on the same model as the Regular 
Army but administered by the new County Associations, the Territorial Force would 
promote military values in schools and universities by encouraging physical activity, drill 
and rifle shooting.  Upon mobilisation, the Territorials would garrison ports, replace regular 
garrisons, provide home defence against enemy raids and, after six month’s training, be 
ready for overseas service.  The need for political compromise, however, in February 1907 
blurred Haldane’s vision because his Liberal colleagues opposed the idea of overseas 
commitment and the role of the force was changed to primarily that of home defence with 
volunteers being permitted to serve overseas if they had taken the Imperial Service 
Obligation.137  In the years leading up to the First World War, the relationship between the 
Regulars and Territorials was an uncomfortable one with each being suspicious of the 
other.138  There was opposition by some War Office staff to funds being allocated to the 
stay-at-home Territorials, when in their view the nation’s greatest need was for an effective 
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Expeditionary Force.139  In his 1914 essay ‘Naval and Military Situation’, Esher summed 
up this uneasy relationship by claiming that ‘the Regular soldier thinks of the Territorial 
Force as an athlete thinks of a lame brother’.140  This uneasy relationship was fuelled by 
concerns reported in the newspapers regarding the efficacy and value of the Territorial 
Force.  Such articles were seized upon by the National Service League who challenged the 
Territorial Force’s ability to defend Britain against land attack.141  This criticism endured 
until the Territorial Force demonstrated its value in August 1914. 
 
Managing the politics of change is vital in ensuring that the interests of various groups 
involved with it are considered.  Change should not eliminate an institution’s politics but 
instead find ways of harnessing and understanding them in order to predict the outcomes of 
any action or intervention.142  Haldane, realising that those with long traditional links to the 
Militia, Yeomanry and Volunteers might prove resistant to change, established the 
Territorial Force Committee in order to ensure that the interests of all the auxiliary forces 
were considered.  But the committee, as Esher reported to the King, comprised  
a large majority of persons who hold or have held commissions in Your Majesty’s 
Regular (Esher’s italics) Army, and whose prejudices may be reasonably assumed 
to be favourable to the Regular, when brought into accidental conflict of interest 
with the Auxiliary Forces.143 
Unsurprisingly, this large, unwieldy and polarised committee could not reach general 
agreement and it disbanded without producing a report, but it did, however, provide a 
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forum in which contention could be discussed.144  In a concession to the Yeomanry and 
Volunteer colonels, who baulked at the idea of being administered by County Associations, 
Haldane abandoned the wholly elective nature of the County Associations and placed them 
under the control of the Army Council who would directly appoint the lord lieutenant, 
chairman and vice-chairman allowing co-opted members to come from local employers and 
workers.145  Additionally, to placate the Unionist-dominated House of Lords, he excluded 
the Militia from the Territorial Force and provided them with the option of enlisting into 
the Special Reserve.146  These compromises, coupled with the political concession to revert 
the second line’s role to that primarily of home service, weakened Haldane’s nation in arms 
which would struggle to reach full strength in the years leading up to the First World War.   
 
In reforming the Yeomanry and Volunteers, Haldane dealt with the individualistic beliefs 
and traditions of the nineteenth century where each unit was regarded as the property of the 
Commanding Officer (CO).  Each unit received a government grant towards maintenance 
and training but it was often supplemented with funds from the CO’s own pocket thereby 
affording him autocratic powers.    To remove this propriety notion, Haldane placed each 
unit under the financial control of the County Association but he separated the functions of 
training and administration from each other, directing the administrative grant to the 
County Associations and the training grant to the chain of command.  The idea of 
separating command and financial functions was wholly novel and Haldane expended 
considerable personal effort in convincing those individuals who opposed his reforms to 
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change their mind.147  Writing to Esher, he reported his success in converting nine lords 
lieutenant to the cause in that ‘they came suspicious and I think there is no doubt that they 
have gone away with wholly new views and [are] keen’.148  Haldane also travelled the 
length and breadth of the country to speak at rallies, dine with Volunteers or present prizes 
at newly formed Territorial units.  Travelling by train, he would often not get home until 
the small hours and this process continued for some eighteen months until the Territorial 
and Reserve Forces Bill passed through Parliament in June 1907.  Attending several 
engagements each week took its toll and he complained to his mother that ‘last night I again 
dined with Volunteers – I am rather weary of it, but it has to be done’.149  By this, Haldane 
understood that the route to reform lay in changing the Volunteer CO’s mind-set which 
would impact positively upon his unit’s culture.150  If the CO supported reform, so would 
his unit. 
 
With his nation in arms, Haldane also endeavoured to address the public’s attitude towards 
the Army in an attempt to improve recruitment.  Attracting sufficient numbers of recruits to 
offset the wastage caused by desertion, discharge and death was a persistent problem, 
particularly under the voluntary system.  Previous attempts to augment numbers by 
increases in pay, improved allowances and preferable terms of service and a reduction in 
physical standards failed to attract sufficient numbers.151  Additionally, initiatives to 
increase the quantity and quality of recruits failed because of the profound contempt with 
which society viewed a military career.  Consequently, the Army did not broaden its social 
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composition and continued to draw the majority of its recruits from the lower working 
classes.152  The officer class was also drawn from a narrow social pool and were nearly all 
the product of public schools.  It was assumed that by the time an officer cadet reached 
Sandhurst or Woolwich,153 he had already gained the necessary social and moral qualities 
required of an officer and gentleman.  It was almost impossible for someone who had not 
passed through this system to become an officer, although there were exceptions.154  An 
exclusive educational background, a commitment to country pursuits, loyalty to 
institutions, a gentlemanly ethos, amateurism, self-confidence and physical courage were 
the qualities required of an officer and these were all associated with the middle and upper 
classes.155 
 
Haldane’s plans to increase both officer and soldier numbers on paper appeared relatively 
simple but their adoption was distinctly harder.  There was a shortage of senior 
commanders and staff officers, the cavalry lacked mounts, the artillery had insufficient 
gunners to man all of their pieces and the Aldershot Corps was undermanned to the point 
that it could not deploy.156  Haldane required an additional 4,000 first line officers and 
6,000 second line officers to fill posts in the new Regular and Territorial forces.  The OTC, 
a scheme designed by the War Office to offset this shortfall, subsumed the existing school 
and university corps and placed branches at selected schools and universities.  Officially 
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funded, the War Office imposed more rigorous training and cadets who completed the 
approved training qualified for certificates that would reduce the period of further training 
should they join the Special Reserve.157  This inducement proved unappealing; by 1912, of 
the 18,000 who had completed service in the OTC, only 283 had joined the Special 
Reserve.158  Fears of invasion, an interest in the military, patriotic duty and a desire to join 
friends and family in social and recreational activities appealed to a small proportion of the 
population, but attitudes towards part-time soldiering, like those towards regular service, 
had markedly limited appeal.159  By 1913 the Territorial Force was sixteen percent below 
strength mainly due to a widespread perception that being a Territorial soldier came at 
significant personal cost.  The potential loss of income while at weekend and summer 
camp, the travel costs to weekly drill nights and the cost of an occasional meal all 
contributed towards the Territorial Force being 51,000 under strength in 1914.160 
 
In order to increase the Army’s appeal, and ignoring Arnold-Forster’s advice that he 
‘should leave the remedy to nature; things will get right in time’,161 Haldane returned to the 
Cardwellian terms of service and subsequently enjoyed a net growth of manpower.  He did, 
however, benefit from his predecessors’ legacies; Brodrick had created surplus in the Army 
Reserve and Arnold-Forster’s terms of service ensured low wastage in the latter years of 
Haldane’s administration.162  Haldane attempted to improve the quality of the recruits, not 
solely through increases of pay and improvements to the soldiers’ living quarters, but by 
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the further development of a movement he had witnessed when visiting units.  He told 
Parliament that  
All through the Army there is distinct evidence that a social movement has set in ... 
Better education, better conditions, a great improvement, I think, in the zeal and 
earnestness of the officers; and the South African War has been a stimulating 
influence among our officers; all these things are combining to improve the social 
level of the Army.163 
Haldane wanted to develop this movement by returning the soldier to society better 
educated, with useful skills and more able to find employment. 164  He desired the Army to 
be more progressive and, drawing on his lifelong interest in education, he introduced a 
number of plans to provide soldiers with vocational training and education.  However, 
financial constraints, trade union concerns and apathy on the soldiers’ part prevailed and 
the schemes petered out by 1908.165  Having noticed a ‘scientific spirit among the officers 
in the Army’ he questioned ‘why should there not be a BSc degree in the science of 
war?’166  Haldane thought that this would make the Army an attractive career option while 
improving the overall quality of the officer.  All aspects of an institution’s operation, he 
thought, needed trained minds and the Army was no exception167  His establishment of a 
course for administrative officers at the London School of Economics, of which he was co-
founder, was one such example.168  The blossoming scientific spirit and professionalism 
within the Army was reflected in the increase of formal schools and training courses 
covering various military sciences.  Amateurism had begun the very slow process of losing 
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its primary status within the officer corps and military leadership was beginning to be 
accepted as a demanding and sober profession that demanded relentless research and 
study.169   
 
The Army’s experience in South Africa and the protracted emergence of professionalism 
within the officer corps had a marked effect on training.  Training became a cumulative 
process, starting with individual training in the winter, progressing through sub-unit, unit 
and formation level training up to divisional manoeuvres in late summer.  Training was 
more comprehensive than before the South African War and larger in scale.  The war had 
highlighted the dangers of fire zones swept by long-range small calibre rifles and tactics 
were developed to counter this.  Combined arms operation, concealment, extended 
formations and flank attacks were trialled and developed to produce the doctrine known as 
fire and manoeuvre.170  Low-level exercises, where seizing the offensive remained the 
essence of training, were often conducted without orders from officers to engender the use 
of initiative within the ranks.171  As the new Army took shape, a spirit of enthusiasm spread 
throughout the ranks.  Competition between battalions and regiments fuelled this 
enthusiasm and the annual exercises afforded units and formations the opportunity to 
experiment with and showcase their newly acquired skills.172  
 
Ellison stated that ‘over and over again in his memoranda, Mr Haldane emphasized that at 
long last, the Nation and the National Army were identical’.173  This was wishful thinking 
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because the small, professional force that mobilised in 1914 was not more representative of 
the whole of society.  Both officer and soldier were drawn from narrow elements of it but 
they had developed a pride in their profession.  The Army had learnt from their experiences 
in South Africa and, in adapting new tactics and procedures, had applied those lessons in 
peacetime training.174  While Haldane had failed to significantly change the social 
composition of the Army, he had nurtured its nascent professionalism.  Professionalism 
demanded the peacetime development of skills that were essential in war.   It required the 
instruction of tactical and training skills relevant to the new conditions of warfare and relied 
upon their regular practice at all levels of command.  Above all, the Army’s 
professionalism required the organisational framework and determination which was 
presented by the Haldane reforms.175 
 
Haldane understood the technical and social dimensions of institutional change and 
recognised that he had to reform both if it was to be effective.  The technical dimension of 
his reforms saw him address the structure of the fighting forces and, just as importantly, the 
structure of the War Office.  In providing impetus to the growing spirit of science and 
professionalism within the Army, training became more realistic and manoeuvres in 
peacetime practised the skills and methods required in war.  In attempting to reform the 
social dimension of the Army he had to also improve the public’s perception of it.  His 
vision of a nation in arms, one that was unique to Britain, was the means by which he 
would feed the second line without resorting to conscription while also improving the 
quality of the recruit.  He failed to fully realise his nation in arms concept because he could 
not change the public’s perception of the military; full or part-time military service was not 
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an attractive proposition.  The problem with the Army ‘from the aspect which it touches the 
nation’ would not be resolved until November 1914, when its ‘sharp point of finely 
tempered steel’ had finally lost its edge. 
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CHAPTER FOUR 
OPERATING ENVIRONMENT 
‘He comes, he smiles, he conquers.’176 
 
In June 1912, when Haldane was appointed Lord Chancellor, he bequeathed to his 
successor, Colonel John Seely, an ordered, motivated and efficient governmental 
department and an army that was capable of rapid mobilisation and deployment.  It was 
Haldane’s vision that had created this situation and it was through his character and 
leadership that he drove through his reforms.  Nadler states that ‘no single factor has more 
influence in changing an organisation’s operating environment than the ... behaviour of its 
leader’.177    To understand why, the operating environment has to be understood.   
 
In any large-scale organisational change, maintaining a healthy balance between the 
concerns of the people within the organisation and the new strategy and structure is always 
the hardest aspect to implement.  Changing direction and purpose can be relatively quick 
but changing values, beliefs and behaviour consumes much more effort, time and 
determination.  The operating environment concerns the needs of the people and implies 
that a direct relationship exists between the way the people work and relate to those around 
them and how they interact with the organisation.  This relationship is often overlooked and 
there is a tendency for an organisation’s ‘hardware’, its work and formal arrangements, to 
overshadow the ‘software’, its people and informal arrangements.  Values, beliefs and 
behaviour are pivotal to an organisation’s strategic success and an organisation must 
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address the software as well as its hardware.  Failure to do so will see the creation of 
obstacles to change, many of which will be unforeseeable, and because resistance is so 
common, learning to overcome them is crucial to leading change at every level.178  Most 
barriers will be economic, bureaucratic or political and surmounting them requires guile, 
energy and effort.  Without highly motivated behaviour, these barriers could stall 
transformation or reduce it to a crippling pace.179  Furthermore, changing an institution is 
an undertaking that takes many years.  Continuity of leadership in this area is essential and 
a leader who can think in the long term is invaluable.  A leader’s determination to see the 
fulfilment of a plan will ensure that new procedures are grounded in the institution’s culture 
thereby preventing homeostasis.  Whereas structures and systems are management tools, 
the culture of the operating environment is the domain of leadership.180  
 
Haldane understood that he needed time in post for his reforms to take effect and that they 
would impact upon the values, beliefs and behaviour of those within or associated with the 
Army.  In his maiden speech as Secretary of State for War on 8 March 1906, he appealed 
for time to implement his reforms and lay a solid foundation on which future reforms could 
be built.  He did not want to 
 ... meddle rashly with the complicated organisation on which [the] military policy 
depends [and] find when the swing of the pendulum brings in another set of 
Ministers, perhaps with different ideas, and perhaps under some popular impulse, 
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that you return to the old state of things with a new avalanche of expenditure, and 
things are worse than they were before.181 
In his second speech to Parliament on 12 July 1906 he suggested that 
 ... whether we disband soldiers of the Line, or discharge workmen from factories 
because munitions of war have not to be made to so great an extent, or whether we 
should reduce staffs, we ought to do it as gently as possible, so as not to allow the 
individual to suffer more than we can possibly help.182   
From the outset, Haldane understood that he needed time to put in place the Army’s new 
hardware but was equally mindful of the software that was crucial to its efficient operation.  
This chapter will focus on Haldane’s character and his relationship with his military staff, 
political colleagues and wide circle of influential acquaintances and how they influenced 
and shaped his reforms.  It will demonstrate that Haldane relied on his intellect, philosophy 
and social skills to remove barriers to change and convince reluctant converts to support his 
reforms.  It will also examine his interest in military affairs and re-examine whether he had 
ideas about army reform before taking post. 
 
Haldane was an amiable and genial individual who accepted his misfortunes and learned to 
stand by them.  The death of his onetime fiancée, Valentine Ferguson in September 1897 
was, perhaps, the most painful of his sufferings and in his autobiography he commented 
‘that my love for her, though it failed, had brought to me not loss but great gain.  For it 
enlarged the meaning and content of life for me’.183  Thereafter Haldane grew closer to and 
relied more on his mother, to whom he wrote daily when they were apart, and to alleviate 
his obvious loneliness, he embroiled himself in his work, philosophy and wide circle of 
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friends.  Haldane relished entertaining and his dinners were sumptuous feasts where his 
friends, who included the Fabian Socialists Sidney and Beatrice Webb, enjoyed his 
generous hospitality.  Such frequent extravagance had an effect on Haldane’s health with 
his weight and pallid complexion later diagnosed as the symptoms of diabetes, from which 
he occasionally endured attacks of temporary blindness.  Guests invited to his dinners 
included some of the most notable figures of the literary, social, political, military and legal 
circles in which he moved.184  But he also used these dinners to conciliate opposition to his 
reforms.  An irascible and unconvinced old Militia Colonel declared that, having just 
endured one of the Haldane’s sumptuous and soporific lunches, ‘he felt exactly like a calf 
well licked over by a Boa Constrictor as a preliminary to deglutition’.185   
 
Current historical understanding is that Haldane did not pay much attention to or take a 
great interest in military affairs before taking post.  Correlli Barnett stated that ‘Haldane 
brought no prior military knowledge and no set scheme of reform into office’.186  Spiers 
argues that ‘from the opposition benches ... Haldane may have viewed army reform as of 
less importance than he subsequently cared to remember [and] ... disinterest (sic) in army 
reform merely acknowledges that he was in the mainstream of Liberal opinion.’187  But 
Haldane was not in the mainstream of Liberal opinion; he was a Liberal Imperialist.  From 
1899, the ‘Limps’ as they were called by their critics, attempted to balance support of the 
war effort in South Africa while maintaining their Liberal identity and in doing so openly 
disagreed with their pro-Boer Radical colleagues and caught the attention of the 
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Unionists.188  Simultaneously balancing a political career with life at the Bar, Haldane 
demonstrated a mastery of the technicalities of explosives in a high profile legal case 
which,189 coupled with a chance encounter with the Secretary of State for War, Lord 
Lansdowne, led to him being appointed a member on the Explosives Committee in May 
1900.  The committee, chaired by Lord Rayleigh, was raised to decide upon the optimum 
smokeless propellant for the Army and during the four years Haldane was associated with 
it, he came into contact with many of the nation’s leading sailors and soldiers.190  He 
enjoyed their company, telling his mother that ‘last night I dined among soldiers – with the 
Ordnance Club – of which I am one of the few non-soldier members.  I think I am well 
rooted in the affections of both the Army and Navy’.191 
 
It is safe to assume that Haldane’s military knowledge increased while serving on the 
committee and Haldane’s biographer, Sir Frederick Maurice, claims that during this period 
‘he was coming more and more to the conclusion that one of the main causes of our failures 
in South Africa was defective [army] organization’.192  In a speech to his constituents at 
Haddington on 4 October 1901, Haldane called for a ‘powerful navy ... [and] a small army 
– one extremely efficacious and capable for foreign service which would be mobile ...’.193   
While Spiers is perhaps too quick to dismiss Haldane’s attitude to army reform as naval 
bias,194 the speech, in effect, outlined the reforms that he would introduce five years later.  
Leo Amery in his memoirs My Political Life supports Maurice’s claim.  Amery, who was 
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editor of The Times History of the South African War, was a founding member of ‘The 
Coefficients’, a dining club established by the Webbs in 1902, which comprised leading 
social reformers of the Edwardian era.  Commenting upon the benefits of being a member, 
Amery claimed that it had ‘brought me into close association with the Liberal Imperialist 
leaders Grey and Haldane.  In them I found men genuinely concerned at the military 
deficiencies revealed by the [South African] War and ready to play their part as 
constructive critics’.195  Haldane was indeed willing to play his part; in a letter to Ian 
Hamilton written in November 1904, Amery reports that ‘Haldane tells me that he and 
some other Liberal have been devoting a good deal of attention to military affairs recently, 
and if the extreme Little Englanders can only be kept in check the Liberal regime at the 
War Office may not be so hopeless after all’.196   
 
In February 1905, with Balfour’s Unionist government coming to the end of its political life 
and the Liberals expected to win power, Clarke wrote to Haldane outlining his concerns 
regarding a Liberal government’s stance on national defence, enclosing a paper detailing 
how it could ‘devote itself in grim earnest to retrenchment and reforms of the public 
finances’.197  The paper proposed ten areas of cuts in the Army, four of which can be seen 
in Haldane’s reforms implemented two years afterwards.198  Later that month, Lord Roberts 
asked to see Haldane because he had discovered that he had visited Mary Strachey, wife of 
the Spectator editor, to discuss ‘... a subject which I have much at heart viz: some kind of 
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Universal Training’.199  Roberts believed that Haldane was of the same opinion.  Haldane, 
however, understood that compulsion was politically unacceptable in peacetime and would 
later refuse to countenance it as Secretary of State for War, an appointment that he was 
forewarned about by Esher.  Walking together along the banks of the River Dee in October 
1905, Esher explained that it was unlikely that Haldane would get the Woolsack but would 
instead get the War Office when the new Liberal government formed.  Esher, reporting the 
matter to his son, stated that ‘Haldane takes very sensible views about the Defence 
Committee, which is a good thing’.200  Eight days later, Haldane had expressed to Esher 
that he ‘favoured making the [CID] more ‘technical’ and ‘expert’ and less political’.201   
 
Haldane’s ‘blushing bride’202 response to the Army Council who pressed him for an outline 
of his reforms when taking office, is frequently used to demonstrate that he knew nothing 
of military reform.  This was certainly not the case.  Haldane was undoubtedly interested in 
military affairs and had ideas from as early as 1901 about army reform.  By October 1905 
he was already thinking about how he wanted to proceed when in post and, pace what has 
been written, he evidently did not go to the War Office without any military knowledge or 
preconceived ideas about army reform.  The evidence in support of this claim has been too 
readily dismissed by historians such as Barnett, Fraser and Spiers, who instead attribute 
Haldane’s success to the lack of preconceived ideas before taking office.203  The ‘blushing 
virgin’ comment should instead be used to demonstrate that he was a shrewd politician who 
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understood the concerns and apprehensions of the Army and War Office staff.  Having 
witnessed Brodrick’s and Arnold-Forster’s much lauded preconceived ideas fail when in 
office, he very sensibly declared that he had no such ideas and that he instead was going to 
listen to his advisors.   In doing so, he gained the support of his generals. 
 
Haldane undoubtedly entered office at a time favourable for army reform and benefitted 
from the work of those before him.  The long-term effects of the Cardwell Reforms, 
coupled with the healthy shock provided by ‘Black Week’ during the initial stages of the 
South African War, had resulted in higher standards of education and military training 
which in turn saw the officer class develop a more professional spirit.  Bond suggests that 
Haldane, a life-long campaigner for the improvement of education, was the ideal Secretary 
of State for War to nurture and encourage this new spirit.204  But it was not easy.  Writing 
to Countess Haig in 1928, Lieutenant General Sir Gerald Ellison outlined the problems 
faced by Haldane upon taking office.  He had to contend with three main military 
difficulties.  First, the older school of thought, which objected to too formal and too rigid a 
type of organisation for the Army, favouring instead an improvisational style of command 
and control.  Second, the younger school of thought who realised the necessity for reform 
but failed to understand how swingeing and far ranging the changes would need to be to 
effect real efficiency.  Finally, there were the vested interests of the existing organisation of 
the Regular Army, Militia, Yeomanry and the Volunteers who were certain to resist any 
changes to their status and organisation.205  But before Haldane attempted to create order, 
he took stock of the situation and learnt about the institution he had just inherited.  
Furthermore, he surrounded himself with capable advisors and placated the senior officers 
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in the War Office.  Updating Rosebery about progress in the War Office, Haldane wrote 
that ‘My first task has been to get the Generals on good terms with each other.  As they are 
no longer on deadly terms with the Secretary of State this has not been difficult ... ’206  
Writing the same day to his mother, Haldane reported the tone in the War Office had 
changed and that ‘the Generals have shaken hands and are all writing together to carry out 
my scheme’.207  Carnall argues in Managing Change in Organisations (1990) that for 
change to succeed, a leader must know his organisation, have a wide range of contacts and 
enjoy a good working relationship with those around him.208  By the time Haldane returned 
to London in February 1906, he had achieved this. 
 
Haldane’s military Private Secretary, Colonel Gerald Ellison, was recommended to him by 
Clarke and Esher.  Ellison had served as Secretary to the War Office Reconstitution 
Committee, or the Esher Committee as it became known, which was appointed by Balfour 
in November 1903.209  The committee’s task was to investigate and propose changes in the 
War Office organisation.210  Working with considerable alacrity and unity, the committee 
issued its third and final report in March 1904.  In sum, the reports recommended that the 
CID be given a full time secretary and permanent staff, the separation of command, 
administration and policy making within the War Office, the abolition of the Commander-
in-Chief post and its replacement by a policy making Army Council and a suitable General 
Staff with clear functions in peace and war.  Balfour endorsed the committee’s findings and 
accepted that they had to be implemented swiftly.  Earnestly involving himself with the 
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strategic matters of the CID, Balfour was less interested in its administration and failed to 
force through the changes in the War Office.  At the same time, the newly formed Army 
Council, led by the ineffectual Sir Neville Lyttelton, hesitated over the structure, pay and 
duties of the General Staff which, much to Esher’s frustration, was still not formally created 
by the time Haldane took office in December 1905.211 
 
Esher had found in Ellison someone who he thought could influence the Secretary of State 
for War and progress his own ideas on military reform.  Writing in his journal in December 
1905, Esher stated that he  
saw Haldane and had a long and most satisfactory talk.  He professes that he is 
‘willing to be nobbled’ by our Committee!  Today I telephoned ... Ellison and asked 
him if he would like to be Haldane’s private secretary ... Of course nothing could 
indicate more clearly the ‘nobbling’ of Haldane by our Committee!212   
The next day Esher wrote to his son reporting that Haldane 
liked Ellison and will, I think, take him.  He told me that he proposed to rely on 
Clarke and me but I take these assurances a little ‘cum grano’ as he is a manager of 
men! ... Then talked about plans, and I urged him to complete WO organisation, 1st 
Army Corps; and next year to begin to think about estimates and the militia.213   
 
It is not surprising that Haldane listened to Esher’s advice; he had, after all, been involved 
with army reform since the Elgin Commission214 and had the ear of the King.  By thinking 
that he could ‘nobble’ him, however, Esher had discounted Haldane’s intellect and 
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philosophical logic and ignored his own observation in that he was ‘a manager of men’.  
Haldane’s greatest intellectual asset was his philosophical grounding.  Having studied 
philosophy at Edinburgh University, during which time he spent a semester at Göttingen 
University in 1874, he approached army reform by applying general business principles and 
bringing order into administrative chaos.215  When studying in Germany, Haldane 
immersed himself in its literature and Goethe, Lotze and Hegel left profound impressions 
on him.  John Muirhead, the British Idealist philosopher, regarded Haldane to be one of 
only a few individuals who had mastered Hegelian philosophy at such a relatively young 
age and apply its principles (thesis, antithesis and synthesis) in all areas of his later 
professional career.  His philosophical approach was based upon an adaptable method of 
problem solving but one set against an historical context.  In solving a problem, he 
identified the leading areas and its historical framework of that particular mode of human 
experience and the ideational analysis of it would lead to policy solutions.  Here, if the 
balance was struck between a clear conceptual vision of the organising ideas and the way in 
which they structure experience in a specific sphere, it would lead to a balanced and 
efficient entirety, or whole.  This can clearly be identified in Haldane’s reforms where his 
central theme was to analyse the Army as an ‘organic whole’ and thus identify the main 
organising ideas which were implicit in that area of human experience, in this case the 
perceived logistic and strategic failures of the South African War.  He did this by 
establishing early what the purpose of the Army was and the principles required for 
organising it.  Having identified those principles and what contradicted them, the direction 
of policy became clearer.  This included the acceptance of the ‘Blue Water’ principles and 
its associated view that a large home-based army was no longer needed and recognition that 
the defence of the Empire or a future Continental conflict would require a highly trained 
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and deployable force.216  In his autobiography, Haldane asserted that his philosophy guided 
him throughout his career and 
 led me to the belief in the possibility of finding rational principles underlying all 
forms of experience and to a strong sense of the endeavour to find such principles as 
a first duty ... [as] it helps to bring together the apparently diverging views of those 
with whom one has to deal.217   
Haldane’s philosophy gave him a way of analysing problems, provided a method of 
thinking and clearly guided him throughout his time in office.218 
 
As a Liberal Imperialist, Haldane understood that he was in a difficult political situation 
upon entering office.  Gaining a landslide Liberal victory in the General Election of January 
1906, the majority of the ruling party, who were opposed to the recent South African War, 
demanded retrenchment and feared European military jingoism.  Their cry was ‘Back to 
Army Estimates as before the South African War’ which in reality meant a reduction of 
approximately £9m from the 1906/07 Estimates.219  He also had to placate the 
Conservatives who, by holding the ruling majority in the House of Lords, could delay or 
even halt the progress of his reforms as they passed through Parliament.  But Haldane was a 
skilful politician and his reforms were passed with relatively little friction.  He appeased the 
Radicals by reducing expenditure and not resorting to compulsion and he satisfied the 
Unionists, who numbered just 132 Conservatives and 25 Liberal Unionists,220 and Liberal 
Imperialists by creating an efficient army that was capable of rapid mobilisation.  He could 
not, however, conciliate the supporters of compulsory service, in particular Lord Roberts 
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who in possessing the prestige of being the country’s greatest living soldier, carried 
substantial political clout.  Haldane and the more progressive serving officers around him 
realised that compulsion was impossible politically and the resultant exchange of 
pamphlets, articles and speeches between both camps lasted until the First World War.221 
 
This somewhat simplified synopsis of Haldane’s political success does not reveal the true 
extent of the guile with which he steered his reforms through the Parliamentary process.  
Complaining to Esher that he was being pushed too hard to deliver his reforms, he stated 
that what he had ‘to manage is the House of Commons and this requires a great deal of 
thought’.222  A Member of Parliament for twenty years before achieving ministerial office, 
Haldane had learned how to manage the House of Commons with his involvement with 
educational reform, especially Balfour’s London Universities Act of 1898 and Government 
Education Act of 1902.  He appeared proud when admitting to Rosebery that ‘you know 
nothing of the Arctic and Polar condition into which that House gets when I have had it in 
hand for five hours, and the icy atmosphere has driven its quorum into wintry slumber’.223  
By inducing a stupor among sitting members, resistance was minimised and his reputation 
for long, boring speeches was ‘sufficient to touch off a minor stampede to the tea-room’.224  
His reedy voice, excessively long speeches, halting delivery and reliance upon typewritten 
text, became a useful tool.  Haldane did, however, know how to flatter and win over the 
House.  His first speech as Secretary of State for War was politically very adroit and he 
made every attempt to both appease or even preempt his critics and satisfy his supporters.  
He was humble, candid, and graceful in acknowledging his predecessors’ efforts and he 
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appealed to the better side of each Member’s human nature in seeking support for his 
reforms.  The speech drew particular praise from the Prime Minister, Campbell-
Bannerman, who told Haldane that it was ‘not only a splendid speech but an historical 
speech’.225   Haldane had secured tacit all-party support for his reforms and, in a political 
environment where other social reforms were considered more pressing, he was afforded 
considerable time and latitude to develop his plans.  He was also able to draw on the 
surreptitious assistance of his friend Balfour, by now the leader of the Opposition, who, 
through his interest in strategic matters, army reform and fear of invasion, had ‘bequeathed 
a collection of ideas, reforms, advisers and institutions to Haldane ...’226 
 
Haldane’s legal profession and connection with Germany brought him into close contact 
with King Edward VII, who he came to regard ‘like an old friend’.227  In 1901 he was 
honoured by the King with a Privy Councillorship and in the months leading up to the 
collapse of the Balfour government he was frequently invited to Windsor Castle.   Upon 
hearing about Campbell-Bannerman’s Cabinet in December 1905, the King was said to be 
delighted that Haldane, along with Asquith and Grey, took office in a government where he 
thought their moderate position would provide a suitable counterbalance to those holding 
more extreme views.228  The King was to play a vital role in the raising of the Territorial 
Force and gave impetus to its recruiting by speaking to all lords lieutenant at Buckingham 
Palace in 1907, where he instilled in them the national importance of the scheme and the 
need to support it.  The King also presented colours to newly formed Territorial units at 
Windsor Castle and, in attending reviews the length and breadth of the country, took a 
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partisan political stand in displaying royal support for the embryonic scheme.229  Indirectly, 
the King was also responsible for providing Haldane with his most trusted and capable 
advisor, Major General Douglas Haig. 
 
Haig became friendly with the Royal Family, in particular the Prince of Wales (later King 
Edward VII), through his brother-in-law’s yachting activities.  This connection was 
strengthened when Haig married Dorothy Vivian, a lady-in-waiting at the court of King 
Edward VII.230  It can be safely assumed that Haig met Esher, who was a royal confidant, 
in or around court no later than March 1903.231  In November 1903, Haig wrote to Esher to 
congratulate him on his appointment to head the WORC and, showing considerable 
wisdom, offered him prescient advice about the perils of military reform: 
I feel sure that success will result if you can only get a fair chance and have your 
ideas put into practice before any other method of reform is started! ... Schemes 
seem to be hastily taken up without due consideration of where the ultimate effects 
will be, and then quickly another scheme is started to cover the short-comings of the 
former one.232 
Writing to Esher after the Commission’s final report was published, Haig interestingly 
reveals that he is ‘glad that you found Ellison of value.  I have always had the highest 
opinion of him and am so pleased that he got a chance at last’.233  It would appear that Haig 
had prior experience of Ellison, perhaps from South Africa. 
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Through their time at the royal court, Esher and Haig had become friends and, accompanied 
by their wives, spent time together in the days before the newlyweds returned to India.234  
With Balfour’s government in turmoil and Esher becoming increasingly frustrated that his 
scheme for the General Staff was stalling, it is reasonable to assume that they discussed 
how to progress army reform in the next government and what part Haig could play in the 
War Office.  This is hinted at in a letter to the Viceroy of India, Earl Minto, in the closing 
months of 1905: 
You ask me about ‘the General Staff’ and ‘what part I am to play in it and when’.  I 
personally have heard nothing officially about taking any part in it yet ... I heard 
from [General] French two weeks ago that he hoped matters would soon be resolved 
for me to come home.235 
This letter implies two points.  First, Earl Minto, who had been in India since November 
1905, knew of a plan to put Haig in the War Office.  Second, French, whose military staff 
included Esher’s son Maurice, was facilitating Haig’s return.  A letter early in the New 
Year, however, ends any doubt that Esher was involved in securing his services.  In it Haig 
tells Esher that ‘I am most deeply grateful to you for what you have done in the matter of 
getting me to replace Hutchinson.  If the appointment were offered to me I should of course 
be delighted to accept it ... ’236  In March 1906, on behalf of the Secretary of State for War, 
Esher wrote formally to Haig offering him the post of Director of Military Training.237  
Such was their relationship, that when writing to Esher just before leaving India, Haig tells 
him ‘[I] will take the first opportunity of coming to see you – in fact I would rather delay 
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seeing anyone at the War Office until I have seen you ... ’.238  Haig arrived in the United 
Kingdom on 1 June 1906 and met Haldane for the first time eight days later at General 
French’s Aldershot headquarters.  With Haig now on Haldane’s staff, Esher had put in 
place a progressive officer who sympathised with his views on army reform and 
undoubtedly would have thought that he had again ‘nobbled’ the Secretary of State.  While 
this is both an important consideration regarding the origins of Haldane’s reforms and a 
demonstration of how influential Esher had become, of more importance is the fact that he 
had inadvertently put in place what Nadler calls an ‘Operational Leader’.239  Nadler 
considers the Operational Leader’s function to be critical during institutional change.  As 
the Change Leader’s second-in-command, he is responsible for shaping the environment 
and motivating people to work and behave in ways that support the change agenda.  The 
Change Leader initiates change and the Operational Leader consolidates it and to achieve 
this they must remain in post simultaneously for a prolonged period.  Ideally, the 
Operational Leader should be appointed no earlier than a year after the change process has 
begun.240 
 
Prior to Haig’s arrival in the War Office, Haldane was struggling to garner support for his 
Territorial Force among the many heterogeneous groups it affected.  Writing to Lady Haig, 
Ellison reported that ‘Haldane’s chief difficulty was in knowing where to turn for 
advice’.241  To affect change, Haldane realised that he would have to take a stronger line, 
which would undoubtedly be unpopular and therefore needed a durable, charismatic 
individual to implement them.  He found these qualities in Haig who proved to be an 
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indispensable Operational Leader and his ‘influence and active assistance, both in framing 
policy and elaborating details of organisation were quite invaluable’.242  Haig was not 
reticent in providing advice and such was his overall impact in the War Office that Ellison 
thought without him 
Mr Haldane would have been hard put to it to elaborate a practical scheme of 
reorganisation in the first instance, or to drive the scheme through to its logical 
conclusion ... Haig was quick to grasp the essential points of any given situation, 
and once he had made his mind what ought to be done, he looked neither to the right 
nor to the left but drove straight ahead to the ultimate end he had in view.243 
Although Haig arrived in the War Office only six months after the change process started, 
opposed to Nadler’s suggestion of at least twelve months, both he and Haldane did hold 
their posts for a prolonged period and did see the fruits of their labours.  When Haig 
returned to India in October 1909, the Regular Army and newly created Special Reserve 
and Territorial Force were at an embryonic phase of their development but the critical work 
had been completed and the reforms had been cemented in the foundations of the nation’s 
psyche.  In Haig, Haldane had found, or more precisely, was given ‘the staff officer of his 
dreams’.244 
 
Haldane was a product of the environment in which he operated.  Belonging to a wide-
ranging, immensely influential and complex social network, Haldane would have 
undoubtedly been influenced by other member’s views, positively or otherwise.  That is not 
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to say that he did not welcome them or was unaware of why he was being ‘nobbled’.  
Politically savvy, his knowledge and understanding of philosophy, which he declared his 
‘herz-studium’ [life-long passion],245 guided him throughout his career and gave him the 
means to analyse divergent views, synthesise them and then formulate policy.  More 
importantly, however, his philosophy taught him to examine the whole, not just its 
constituent parts.  As discussed in previous chapters, this ultimately was the key to his 
success. 
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CHAPTER FIVE 
CONCLUSION 
‘The future will not disclose its secrets’246 
 
Haldane was almost certainly given the appointment of Secretary of State for War by 
Campbell-Bannerman as a rebuke for his part in the failed Relugas Plot.247  As the minister 
of a government department that was regarded as the grave of many a promising political 
reputation and one which no one ‘will touch ... with a pole’,248 many of Haldane’s pacifist 
Radical Parliamentary colleagues would have undoubtedly assumed that he would not 
remain in office long, let alone implement any military reforms.249  In keeping with 
tradition, his Unionist predecessor had added his name to the War Office’s burial plot.  
Arnold-Forster’s attempts to implement reform failed because he lacked Cabinet support 
and invoked the resistance of the Army, which regarded his proposals too revolutionary 
and, furthermore, was tactless in his dealings with senior officers.250  Haldane, however, 
possessed the skills and personal characteristics that Arnold-Forster lacked.  Independently 
minded and a master of political intrigue, he had a first-rate intellect, trained in philosophy 
and law.  Revelling in hard work, his intellect gave him the ability to swiftly identify the 
crux of a problem and his philosophy provided him with the means of addressing it.  An 
educationalist, he incorporated advances in technology, education and management into his 
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reforms and maintained a close interest in developments abroad, particularly those in 
Germany.  His wide social network contained most of the country’s ruling elite whom he 
lavishly entertained at home with his sumptuous dinners.251  He was a founding member of 
the Coefficients, a hugely influential dining club, whose other members included Milner, 
Amery, Maxse and Repington,252 all influential politicians or journalists who harboured 
strong opinions about army reform.  Haldane possessed the intellectual, political and social 
skills required to effect change but was also particularly adroit at handling human 
situations.  He was, however, not without fault.  As Esher commented, he liked to be ‘all 
things to all men’,253 and he compromised too readily on key issues regarding the 
Territorial Force, Militia and County Associations, which, in effect, emasculated his nation 
in arms concept.254  Haldane took the lion’s share of the credit for his reforms while in 
reality he depended heavily on the work of his professional advisors, whom he would later 
fail to acknowledge or thank.255  His political naivety regarding his relationship with 
Germany would ultimately lead to his removal from public office in 1915, albeit 
temporarily, but this admiration had not manifested into pro-German sympathies, an 
accusation unfairly levelled by his enemies.  Notwithstanding these faults, in June 1912, 
when he became Lord Chancellor, Haldane passed the War Office to his successor with his 
political reputation very much alive.  What started in December 1905 as a punishment 
posting ended over six years later with Haldane taking ‘his place as one of only two really 
great and successful War Ministers in the last hundred years’ [1860 – 1960],256 the other 
being Cardwell.  He had created an expeditionary force, which was capable of deploying to 
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Europe within fifteen days and relied on a simple yet effective two-line system to support 
and expand it.257  Haldane’s talents and personal qualities were pivotal to its creation and 
he proved that he was very much the right man to be appointed Secretary of State for War. 
 
Nadler and Tushman argue that institutional change can only succeed if all its component 
parts are in balance, or congruence; the higher the degree of congruence, the more effective 
an institution becomes.258  Haldane demonstrated that he understood this in his speech to 
Parliament on 8 March 1906 where, using the analogy of an obese patient whose leg could 
be amputated to save bulk, he argued that while this ‘may get down his weight ... [it] will 
not do him any good’.259  He realised the dangers of reforming the Army piecemeal and 
approached his reforms by first understanding the nature of the problem before devising a 
solution to deal with the organic whole.  His five weeks in Scotland at the end of 1905 and 
beginning of 1906 afforded him the opportunity to do such and, drawing on his mastery of 
Hegelian philosophy which provided him with a method of problem solving set against an 
historical context, he formed his own solution about how to shape the British Army and 
provide it with a focus.  Contrary to historical orthodoxy, he was certainly not a ‘blushing 
virgin just united to a bronzed warrior’,260 as he approached this task with a degree of 
military knowledge and ideas about army reform.  He entertained the views of those close 
to him, especially Esher and Ellison and read Clausewitz, Schellendorf and du Picq to 
understand the foundations on which the Continental armies had been grounded.261  Having 
analysed and considered these views, his solution was a synthesis of them all but was one 
that was politically, militarily and socially acceptable.  The solution was his version of a 
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nation in arms, a uniquely British concept which, taking heed of the Operating 
Environment had to rely on the voluntary system to fill its ranks.  It addressed the regular 
and auxiliary forces and balanced both the technical and social axes of its Operating 
Organisation while responding more coherently to the external forces affecting the 
Organisation Components, particularly the need to mobilise rapidly in defence of the 
Empire or in support of France in a war against Germany.  Paramount was the need to 
reduce expenditure and he achieved this by cutting surplus and decreasing the size of the 
Army until costs fell below £28 million; the nation in arms was then modelled on what was 
left.  This was the key to his success.  Opposed to the more traditional method of designing 
an ideal solution which was then compromised by accepting reduced capability in order to 
make it affordable, Haldane did the reverse.  He compromised at the very beginning 
thereby ensuring what was created from the remaining resources was affordable and 
capable of achieving its purpose.  By reducing the Estimates as a matter of political 
expediency, he also garnered the tacit support of his Radical colleagues.  Coupled with the 
support of Balfour, his friend and Conservative Leader of the Opposition, who recognised 
in Haldane the commitment to cement his own earlier reforms, he placated both sides of the 
House making the passage of his reforms through the Parliamentary process somewhat 
easier. 
 
Haldane realised that the support of his generals in the War Office was essential if his 
reforms were to be successful.  Having witnessed Brodrick and Arnold-Forster enter office 
with preconceived ideas on army reform, which annoyed the generals and consequently 
failed, he sensibly announced that he had no such ideas.  His ‘blushing virgin’ response to 
the Army Council is cited too often and too readily by historians as proof that Haldane had 
no knowledge of the military or an understanding of its organisation.  This, however, was 
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the action of a very shrewd politician who knew how to manipulate and manage people.  In 
announcing that he had no preconceived ideas, he immediately allayed the fears of the 
generals who had endured two sets of attempted reforms in the preceding five years, 
thereby gaining the support of the Army Council.  Having purged the ‘old school’ from the 
War Office, Haldane surrounded himself with progressive, ‘thinking’ officers who, in the 
main, had attended Staff College.  These officers, who had fought in South Africa, were 
nearly all ‘Continentalists’ and supported Haldane’s reforms because his proposal to form a 
Striking Force to fight overseas, albeit publicly justified for the defence of the Empire, 
suited their planning for fighting a Continental war.  Led by the ‘arch-intriguer Viscount 
Esher’,262 support for the reforms also came from those who wanted to introduce 
conscription.  They predicted that the final test of the voluntary system would inevitably 
fail and force the government to adopt compulsion.  Haldane knew that his reforms would 
meet with barriers to change and he tackled them by design, compromise, persuasion, 
intrigue and charm.  While Brodrick and Arnold-Forster ignored this factor, Haldane 
understood that institutional change could not take place without the support of those it 
affected. 
 
Haldane was aware that lasting change takes time.  While his ‘blushing virgin’ speech was 
a political ploy to placate the generals, the announced nine-month gestation period after his 
union with the ‘bronzed warrior’ was a clear indication that he was not going to rush his 
reforms.  He remained in post long enough to review the problem, design a solution then 
implement it.  The continuity of his tenure placed significant responsibility on him to 
ensure that his reforms were successful; in effect, he owned the problem and could not 
move on until it was solved.  He expended a considerable amount of time, energy and effort 
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in gathering public and military support for his reforms to ensure that they would become 
deeply embedded within the nation’s culture.  While his reforms and efforts did little to 
improve the wider public’s perception of the British Army, they did succeed in galvanising 
support and in doing so, prevented institutional homeostasis.  This continuity in post 
afforded Haldane the time to review, plan, implement and nurture change but, most 
significantly, time to complete the whole process.  His intellect, philosophical logic and 
understanding of both the science and practicalities of institutional change, meant that in 
leading a governmental department that was responsible for army reform, he was appointed 
to the right place.  
 
In addition to being talented, Haldane was also fortunate with the timing of his appointment 
and here ‘luck plays as much a part in a war minister’s reputation as in a general’s’.263  The 
failings of the British Army in the opening sequence of the South African War had 
triggered a swathe of reforms in the War Office, which subsequently removed the confused 
and chaotic processes by which military advice was produced for the Cabinet.  Replaced by 
the CID and provided with a secretariat by the Esher Committee, Haldane entered office at 
a time when these reforms were reaching culmination.  Formally constituting the General 
Staff shortly after taking office, Haldane would become the first Secretary of State for War 
who had at his disposal a system that was created to provide the political head of the War 
Office with coherent military advice.  Despite their intrigue in the Relugas Plot, the Liberal 
Imperialists were given key appointments in Campbell-Bannerman’s Cabinet; Grey became 
Foreign Secretary and Asquith became Chancellor of the Exchequer and then Prime 
Minister in April 1908.  These key appointments, which influenced and impacted upon 
Haldane’s reforms, were filled by his long-term friends and political collaborators.  
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Haldane benefitted from their support in Parliament where they personally intervened to 
ensure the reforms passed through the legislative process successfully.264  Grey’s 
appointment to the Foreign Office coincided with the appointments of a new group of 
diplomats into the key departmental and ambassadorial appointments throughout Europe.  
This group regarded Germany’s growing military strength as a major threat to British 
security and persuaded Grey to review Foreign Policy.265  Grey, in turn, urged Haldane to 
examine the feasibility of sending the Army to the Continent in support of France in a war 
against Germany.  While the formal unification of foreign and defence policy would be 
sanctioned in later years, this impetus provided the embryonic General Staff in the War 
Office with focus and a purpose for the Army.  With home defence now the preserve of the 
Royal Navy, the requirement to keep an Expeditionary Force ready to fight overseas was 
publicly justified for defending the empire. 
 
Haldane benefitted from the nascent spirit of professionalism growing among the more 
progressive element of the officer corps.  These ‘thinking’ soldiers had become impatient 
with the inefficiency of the Army and wanted to put it on equal footing with those on the 
Continent.  Ellison was one such officer and with Esher thinking that he had ‘nobbled’ 
Haldane by securing him as his private Military Secretary, he had in fact provided Haldane 
with a very capable and loyal staff officer who understood the political problems regarding 
compulsory military service.266  Esher was also instrumental in returning Haig from India 
to work for Haldane in the War Office.  Haig was at the forefront of those who saw an 
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urgent need for the Army to become more professional and his progressive attitude coupled 
with his ability to command respect, allowed him to plan for and implement Haldane’s 
reforms across all levels of the Army.  The mobilisation of the BEF in 1914 bears 
testimony to this.267  No other officers provided Haldane with such sterling support and 
when Dunlop commented that ‘Haig provided Haldane with the staff officer of his dreams’ 
he also recognised that Ellison should be added to the list of people who provided 
invaluable service to the nation, but was ‘a man to whom history has perhaps paid scant 
tribute.’268  Seventy-two years later, Ellison’s contribution still receives scant attention and 
archival material suggests that much more could be gleaned about the Haldane reforms if 
he were afforded serious historical attention. 
 
In the aftermath of the collapse of Balfour’s Unionist government, and at a time of 
considerable foreign, political, domestic and military upheaval, the War Office needed a 
Secretary of State for War who could balance the conflicting demands placed upon him and 
exploit the opportunities presented by the changing domestic and international situation.  
Such a minister would need to interpret that environment and design a suitable response 
that was consistent with strategy while balancing the sometimes conflicting demands of its 
technical and social components.  The confluence of events in late 1905 and early 1906, 
presented an opportunity for radical reform of the Army, an opportunity that may have been 
missed if a suitable Secretary of State for War had not been appointed in time.  Appointing 
Haldane in December 1905, Campbell-Banner unknowingly seized that opportunity and in 
doing so appointed him at the right time. 
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Haldane entered office with an interest in military affairs and notions about army reform.  
With the exception of the Territorial Force, his reforms were shaped around the ideas of 
others; ideas which he actively solicited.  He benefitted from both circumstance and the 
actions of those in post before him and he faced an army that was reluctant to attempt 
another series of reforms.  Yet Haldane succeeded where Brodrick and Arnold-Forster had 
failed.  He had the necessary qualities and attributes required to implement institutional 
change and arrived in the War Office at a time of significant upheaval in domestic, political 
and international affairs, events which demanded army reform.  Upon taking office, 
Haldane, that ‘manager of men’,269 was bequeathed a jigsaw puzzle whose parts were 
‘awaiting the arrival of someone to fit them together.’270  Haldane succeeded where his 
predecessors had failed because he put all of those pieces together, in the right order and at 
the right time.  While the future did not disclose its secrets to him, the past has revealed that 
in solving the whole puzzle, Haldane proved to be the right man, in the right place, at the 
right time. 
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